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IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN
UNIFORMED FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION -AND- CITY OF NEW YORK
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Uniformed Firefighters Association

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #A - 929-79

and
The City of New York (Fire Department)

The stipulated issue is:
When under circumstances complained of by
the Union, the Department details a fireman from the unit to which he is permanently
assigned to another unit after the start of
his tour, and when the Department directs
him to return to his permanent unit from the
unit to which he was detailed within his
regular tour of duty, is either or both a
circumvention of Article XXVI of the contract
and/or a circumvention of PAID 16-72 revised,
as amended, and PAID 5-74 revised? If so what
shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held on December 13, 1979 at which time
representatives of the Union and City appeared and were afforded
full opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine
and cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The parties filed post-hearing briefs.
The only incidents and examples presented by the Union in
this case were those in which a fireman was detailed from the
unit

to

which he was permanently assigned to another unit after

the start of his tour and returned to his original unit before
the end of his tour, when at the beginning of his tour and when
he was detailed all relevant companies were fully manned pursuant

-2to the manning requirements of the contract.
Under that and those circumstances the City did not agree
to, nor does the contract require, the payment of "portal to
portal" pay, nor under that and those circumstances did the
City relinquish its managerial right to order such details.
The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the collective
bargaining agreement between the above named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties makes the
following AWARD:
The foregoing stipulated issue is answered
in the negative. The Union's grievance is
denied.

DATED: April 14, 1980
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman

On this fourteenth day of April, 1980 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

IMPARTIAL CHAIRMAN UNIFORMED FIREFIGHTERS ASSOCIATION
AND
CITY OF NEW YORK (FIRE DEPARTMENT)

In The Matter of The Arbitration
Between
Uniformed Firefighters Association

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #A-830-79
A-840-79

and
City of New York (Fire Department)

The stipulated issue is:
Assuming that the result is a reduction
in minimum manning, has the Department
violated or would the Department be in
violation of the collective bargaining
agreement if it assigned or assigns firemen to operate departmental vans and/or
spare passenger type cars for transportation of firefighting apparatus and equipment, delivery of payrolls, and transportation of departmental personnel or other
persons.
If so, the Impartial Chairman retains
jurisdiction over the question of whether
there was or would be a reduction in minimum
manning, and if so, what remedies (if any)
shall be awarded retroactively and/or prospectively. The rights of the parties on
those questions are expressly reserved for
subsequent hearings.
Hearings were held on October 10 and December 13, 1979 at
which time representatives of the above named parties appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Oath was waived.

,/

The Arbitrator's
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The Union particularized its original grievance in a
letter dated June 18, 1979 setting forth those situations which
it claims are or would be contract violations within the meaning
of the aforementioned stipulated issue.

As recited in that

letter those situations are:
1. Messenger Duty. Department Vans and Spare Chiefs'
Cars are regularly used for messenger duty between command
locations and firehouses reducing minimum manning. In par^
ticular, non-emergency messages including Department orders
and directives are routinely carried between divisional headquarters and between divisional headquarters and borough command
headquarters.
2. Transportation of Non-Firefighting Equipment.
Department vehicles are routinely used to transport non-firefighting equipment, reducing minimum manning, between various
locations, including firehouses, borough and divisional headquarters and repair shops, reducing minimum manning even though
no emergency requires such use.
3. Transportation of Firefighting Apparatus and Equipment.
Vehicles are routinely used to transport firefighting apparatus
or equipment, reducing minimum manning, when no emergency exists.
Items of firefighting equipment requiring immediate repair or
replacement as a result of loss or damage during a tour are not
included in this category. However, scheduled inspection,
maintenance, repair or replacement on a regular basis, particularly where items are accumulated until a certain number of items
are available or until a particular date is reached are included
in this category. Examples of this category are movement of
spare apparatus to and from Department shops, and accumulation
of radios for repair on a regular scheduled basis.
4. Delivery of Department Forms, Records, or Regular
Payrolls. Transportation of Department records, forms and
regular payrolls among command headquarters or to firehouses,
reducing minimum manning, where no emergency exists, is routine.
5. Transportation of Personnel. The Department routinely
transports Department personnel and other persons, reducing
minimum manning, when no emergency exists, particularly to avoid
accrual of overtime.

-3In the course of the hearings the City acknowledged and
stipulated that under the following circumstances situations no.
1. and no. 2. above were or would be contract violations, and that
the same is true with regard to that portion of situation no. 4.
relating to "Department forms and records.":
1. Messenger Duty. Except when an emergency requires
otherwise, all transportation and delivery of messages, letters,
memoranda, circulars, directives, etc. to or from divisional
headquarters, borough command headquarters, Fire Department
headquarters, and between any of the above and firehouses.
2. Transportation of Non-firefighting Equipment. All
transportation or delivery of non-firefighting equipment including,
but not limited to, furniture, office equipment, supplies, and nonfirefighting tools to or from any location, including division
headquarters, borough command headquarters, Fire Department headquarters, and firehouses.
4. Transportation of Department Forms and Records. All
transportation and deliveries of Department forms and records to
or from division headquarters, borough command headquarters or
Fire Department headquarters, and between any of the above and
firehouses, or between firehouses.
The City stated that violations within the meaning of
situations no. 1, 2 and that portion of no. 4 above cited would
be discontinued and/or would not occur prospectively.
Regarding situation no. 3 the Union objects to any reductior
in minimum manning of a company in service by the moving of broker
down apparatus to the repair shop, the "jockeying" of vehicles
from one location to another until the repair shop is capable of
receiving those vehicles, and the return of the apparatus from
the repair shop.

It does not object to the obtaining of spare

apparatus by personnel of a company that is out of service due
to an apparatus breakdown while that company is out of service.

-4As to "equipment" under situation no. 3 the Union excludes
"vital and unique tools," such as power saws, generators and
Hurst tools, essential to firefighting duties which require
immediate replacement.
circumstance an

The Union stipulated that in that

"emergency" exists within the meaning of

Attachment A of the contract, and that a reduction in manning
to obtain and deliver those tools would not violate the contract.
What the Union complains about, as set forth under situation
no. 3 in the aforementioned letter, is the routine collection,
replacement, repair, maintenance and other similar work in
connection with regular firefighting equipment.

As an example

the Union cites the regularly scheduled program of repairing and
replacing handi talkies, radios and spare pieces of equipment
which at present are transported in the types of vehicles referred to in the stipulated issue with consequent reductions in
the manning of regular firefighting companies.
In view of the City's acknowledgement and stipulation,
the only disputed item remaining in situation no. 4 is the
delivery of "regular payrolls."

It is regular procedure for the

payroll to be delivered to each Division before 6:00 p.m. each
Thursday.
Under situation no. 5 the Union does not include nor does
it object to the use of the stipulated vehicles and a consequent
reduction in manning to relieve firemen at fires, or when a
fireman has suffered a serious injury at a fire and requires
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emergency transportation for treatment (even though the Union
believes an ambulance should be available for that purpose).
Rather it objects to the routine movement of uniformed personnel
for foreseeable or planned reasons, such as interviews, the
transportation of firemen from fires with non-serious

injuries,

when ambulances should be used, and the tranportation of nondepartmental personnel such as official visitors from Washington
or elsewhere (e.g. picked up at the airport) when no limited
service firemen ordinarily assigned to that latter work are
available.
The applicable constrod: section is Attachment A Department
Order which reads:
TO: All Officers
FROM: Chief of Department
RE: Use of Department Vans and Spare Chiefs' Cars
I continue to receive reports that manning is being
reduced below minimum levels by assignments of firement to
operate Department Vans and Spare Chiefs' Cars for non-emergency
duties and for duties which do not result from conditions beyond
the control of the Department.
You have been advised that such assignments violate the
collective bargaining agreement, Department rules and regulations
and Department policy. Further assignments of this nature will
not be tolerated.
Your attention is directed to Article XXVII Section 7 of
the collective bargaining agreement which exempts the Department
fromminimum manning requirements only where a vacancy occurs
during a tour due to an emergency or due to conditions beyond
the control of the Department. In all other cases minimum
manning requirements must be strictly observed. Routine matters
are not emergencies. It is not permissible to let routine matters
accumulate until they become emergencies.
In the event an assignment inconsistent with this order is

-6brought to my attention, appropriate measures will be taken by
the Department against the officer making such assignment.
Based on the foregoing contract language, the issue narrows
to whether each or any of the foregoing disputed situations
constitute an "emergency" or are "due to conditions beyond the
control of the Department."

It is noted that in bold type

Attachment A states that:
Route matters are not emergencies.
Based on the record before me and my knowledge of the
operational circumstances involved in each of the disputed
situations, 1 conclude that none of those complained of or
objected to herein by the Union is an emergency or meets the
test of circumstances beyond the Department's control. Each is
either a routine function about which the Department has adequate
experience, notice and knowledge, or is a development which does
not require immediate or emergency attention but rather can be
delayed a reasonable period of time and handled routinely.

It is

fully recognized that all of this work and these activities are
a necessary part of the Department's firefighting function.

But

none of them reach the level of an"emergency" within the traditional
meaning of that word or within its contractual meaning.

There-

fore if minimum manning is reduced by the use of Department vans
and/or spare passenger type cars to carry out those activities,
the minimum manning requirements of the contract and Attachment
A are violated.
Disputes over whether particular functions fall within

-7the foregoing Decision, shall be submitted to me for case by
case determination.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: February 11, 1980
STATE OF New York ).ss.
COUNTY OF New York )
On this eleventh day of February, 1980, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmerts to me known
and known to me to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me
that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
APTA District Council 47, AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1430 1108 795

and
City of Philadelphia

The stipulated issue is:
Is the Union's grievance on behalf of Dr.
Arthur B. Lee arbitrable?
A hearing was held in the Philadelphia offices of the
American Arbitration Association on March 12, 1980 at which
time representatives of the above named Union and Employer
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The basis of the Employer's challenge to the arbitrability
of the grievance is the acknowledged fact that the Union initiated
the grievance at the fourth step, unilaterally bypassing the
earlier steps of the grievance procedure.
Absent the special circumstance of this case, this Arbitrator
would hold that he is bound to the bilaterally negotiated provisions of the contract and would require the Union to follow all
the sequential steps of the grievance procedure, unless by the
joint agreement the parties arranged for the handling of the
grievance differently.

The purpose of such traditional view of
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course, is to afford full opportunity at each step of the grievance
procedure for ample discussion of the problem, for full disclosure
of all of the relevant information, and most importantly for
attempts at resolution of the dispute at levels closest to where
the problem arose and before the adverse positions of the parties
harden.
However these principles are not present in the instant
case, and the circumstances are such as to make preeminent the
well settled legal axiom that a party need not be required to
undertake or exhaust a useless act.

Here it is undisputed that

the decision which gave rise to the grievance, namely the level
of pay for Doctor Lee, was made by the Employer's central personnel
office and not by the Department or the levels of the Department
represented by departmental officials at Steps I through III of
the grievance procedure.

It is Step IV of that procedure which

would involve for the first time management officials from and
representing the Employer's central personnel office where the
policy decision regarding the grievant's salary level was made.
I am persuaded, based on the testimony, that while departmental officials at Steps I through III had the authority to
correct ministerial errors, they had no authority, in dealing with
the issue of the grievant's pay level on a substantive basis, to
make any changes in the policy decision which led to this dispute.
Therefore it is clear that no discussions at the Steps prior to
Step IV could have produced a change in the Employer's position

-3-

regarding the grievant's salary, and the grievance could not have
been adjusted in any manner satisfactory to the Union during or
at those Steps.
On the other hand, it can be argued that the Employer
should be entitled to demonstrate to the Union in the earlier
grievance steps that the Union's grievance lacked merit; that
the Union should drop it; that that opportunity is also a
significant and reciprocal purpose of the grievance procedure;
and that in this case the Employer was not given that opportunity.
I agree with the Employer's argument that the latter are
legitimate and meaningful purposes of the grievance procedure,
but again, I do not find those factors to be realistically
applicable here.

Inasmuch as the policy decision regarding Dr.

Lee's salary was made at the Employer's central personnel office,
and not within the Department for which the grievant works, I
am not persuaded that representatives at the departmental level
are or were in a position to freely deal with the substantive
aspects of that policy, other than to implement and defend it.
They could explain it, but because they were not party to its
formulation, I doubt they could justify it to the extent that the
Union would be persuaded that the grievance lacked merit and
should be abandoned.

Indeed, under those conditions, the dis-

agreement between the parties, rather than being subject to
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potential amelioration, might well have been exacerbated.

For

if the departmental representative at Steps I through III were
in no position to change the Union's mind, the Employer's representatives at the Step IV level might well feel more compelled to
support and affirm the position of the managerial representatives
below, rather than deal with the issue ab initio at the level
where the problem arose.

Put another way, I conclude that the

Employer representatives who would handle the grievance in the
earlier steps were not in a policy position to persuade the Union
of their belief that the grievance lacked merit any more than the
Union at those levels could have convinced the Employer to change
its decision regarding Dr. Lee's salary.
To my mind therefore, under the particular circumstances of
this case and limited to this case alone, the futility of the
grievance steps prior to Step IV is apparent.

Therefore I am not

disposed to foreclose this grievance from any adjudication on its
merits.

Accordingly the grievance is arbitrable and not barred

from arbitration because Steps I through III of the grievance
procedure were not utilized.
The Union should carefully note however that because this
ruling is limited to this situation it may not be construed as a
license to file other grievances in or at later steps of the
grievance procedure or to unilaterally bypass any of those steps.
Other situations may well be different, where utilization of all
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the grievance steps may be useful and consistent with the purpose
and intent of that procedure, and, in subsequent cases, other
arbitrators who may feel strictly bound to the contract steps,
may require precise compliance under any and all circumstances.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
The Union's grievance on behalf of Dr. Arthur
B. Lee is arbitrable.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: April 14, 1980

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
APTA, District Council 47

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #14 30 1108 79 J

and

City of Philadelphia

The stipulated issue is:
Whether or not the City was entitled to
recover money from Dr. Arthur Lee's salary? If not what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held at the offices of the American Arbitration
Association in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania on July 29, 1980 at
which time Dr. Lee, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant",
and representatives of the above named Union and City appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The grievant has a sincere and equitable case which, however,
is preempted by civil service law.
I find that when the grievant was transferred from the
Philadelphia General Hospital to the Medical Service of the prison
system he had reasonable grounds to believe that he had moved at
least laterally in professional rank and that his official status
at the latter location would be that of a Physician II.

At the

Philadelphia General Hospital he was a Receiving Ward Physician,,
He went to the prison system and was assigned and performed the
duties previously performed by the Director of Medical Services
(who at the time was seriously ill) and was regarded as the "Acting
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Director."

In terms of status and responsibility, I would judge

that the Acting Director of Medical Services of the prison system
was no less than that of a Receiving Ward Physician, and I can
appreciate why the grievant believed his transfer was at least
lateral.
Also the grievant testified that when he was interviewed for
the prison job by representatives of the City he was told by a
Mr0 Pisicano that he would be slotted in the civil service classification of Physician II at the prison system and that the pay of
a Receiving Ward Physician and Physician II were equivalent.
Pisicano did not testify at the arbitration hearing.

Mr.

On that basis,

and in the absence of contravening testimony by Mr. Pisicano, I
can understand why the grievant believed that his transfer was at
least lateral.
Moreover the grievant testified, again unrefuted, that he
initiated his transfer from the Philadelphia General Hospital to
the prison system by filing an application for the latter assignment.

He did so in May of 1977, at least a month before the

Philadelphia General Hospital closed.

In that regard I think the

grievant had reason to believe that he was not among those transferred from the Philadelphia General Hospital because it closed,
but rather that his transfer, prompted by his own initiative did
not put him in the category of employees covered by Section 31.23
of the civil service law.
The grievant's reasonable belief that he was accorded and
occupied the Physician II classification at the prison system is
evidenced by the original handwritten notation "Physician II" in

-3the upper left hand corner of the Application For Employment which
he filled out for the transfer.

I accept as t^ruthful his state-

ment that he was later surprised when he saw that the "II" of that
written notation had been subsequently colored in with a felt pen
by a city personnel representative thereby changing it to "I" on
that application

(i.e. a change from

"Physician II" to "Physi-

cian I") .
The Union has not cited nor do I find any provision in the
collective bargaining agreement covering this situation.

The City

argues that what is applicable is Section 31.23 of the civil service
law which reads:
PHILADELPHIA GENERAL HOSPITAL PERSONNEL.
Employees of Philadelphia General Hospital
who are transferred as a result of that unit's
closing to a classification with a lower pay
range shall retain their current annual rate
but shall receive no further increase in pay
until their annual rate falls within the range
for the class to which they are assigned.
In the absence of an applicable provision in the contract,
the Arbitrator should not ignore external law if that law is
applicable.

I find that despite the grievant's legitimate beliefs

as to his status at the prison system, the foregoing civil service
law is applicable to his situation and is controlling.
Though the grievant may have initiated his request for transfer, I must conclude that it was because he knew that the Philadelphia General Hospital would soon be closed and as a consequence
he sought placement elsewhere in City employment.

Based on the

testimony of City witnesses, I conclude that the grievant was
considered and treated as an employee who was transferred or
sought transfer as a result of the planned closing of the Philadelphia

-4General Hospital within the meaning of Section 31.23 of the civil
service law.
It is unrefuted testimony of City witnesses that the only
available medical positions at the prison system at the time of
the grievant's transfer, and the only positions for which there
was a line budget were in the Physician I classification.

In other

words despite the grievant's "desk" assignment as the Acting
Medical Director, and despite his performance of duties that were
the same or similar to those previously performed by the Medical
Director who was on sick leave, the only official job available
to which a salary was attached and for which funds were budgeted
was that of Physician I.

I find that technically and officially

the City gave the grievant the only civil service title available
for which funds were available, and that job was as a Physician I.
(And that accounts for the felt pen change on the Application For
Employment).
Under Section 31.23 of the civil service law covered employees
shall retain their current annual rate but
shall receive no further increase in pay
until their annual rate falls within the range
for the class to which they are assigned.
Classified as a Physician I, the grievant occupied a classification with a lower pay range than what he received as a Receiving
Ward Physician.

When transferred to the prison system he retained,

"red circled", the salary which he was paid previously.

Under

Section 31.23 he should not have received the general contract
wage increase of approximately $2500 on July 1, 1978.

Instead,

under that statutory provision his red circled salary of $35,991
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should have remained unincreased until the wage increases under
the collective bargaining agreement brought the salary of a
Physician I into that range.
It appears to me that as a classified Physician I performing
the duties of the Acting Medical Director of the prisons, the
grievant may have been working out of title in a higher rated job
assignment.

I am not familiar with the civil service law of the

City of Philadelphia (or the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania) but if
under that law the grievant has a cause of action for higher pay
because he performed the duties of a higher job, his right to make
that claim and pursue that cause of action before the Civil Service
Commission, in the courts, or in any other forum with jurisdiction,
is expressly reserved.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
On statutory grounds, and in the absence of
any explicit contrary contract provisions,
the City was entitled to recover money from
Dr. Arthur Lee's salary.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: August 14, 1980

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
AFGE Local 1760

AWARD ON ARBITRABILITY
Case No. 79K/27196

and

Department of Health, Education
and Welfare

The threshold question presented at the hearing on January
17, 1980 is whether the Union's grievance on behalf of Vera
Grayson is arbitrable.
The Employer contends that the Union failed to meet the
time limit set forth in Article 29 Section b of the contract.
That Section reads:
Within 5 workdays from the date of the
request for arbitration, the parties
shall jointly request from the Federal
Mediation and Conciliation Service a
list of five impartial persons qualified
to act as arbitrators.
It is undisputed that the Union gave written notice to the
Employer of its intents to arbitrate the grievance by memorandum
dated September 10, 1979.

However the Union did not present the

Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service Request For Arbitration
Panel to the Employer for joint request of a list of arbitrators
until September 24, 1979.

The Employer's position is that because

more than five workdays elapsed between the date of the request
for arbitration and the submission of the FMCS form, the Union
failed to comply with the Article 29 Section b time limit, and
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that the dispute is now time barred from arbitration.
Based on the testimony and evidence I am satisfied that
the Union constructively, and therefore adequately, complied with
the procedures and time limits of Sections a and b of Article 29;
that under the particular circumstances of this case the Employer
had timely notice of the Union's intent to submit the grievance
to arbitration; and that the Employer was not prejudiced by the
few days delay.
The evidence shows that the local Union president was away
between September 10 and September 17.

There is evidence that

within that period of time the Union's vice-president inquired
of an authorized representative of the Employer about processing
the case to the FMCS.

There is also evidence that on September

17th, the last day within the five workday period, the Union
delivered another written communication to the Employer inquiring
further about the processing of this grievance to arbitration.
I do not dispute the Employer's statement that it did not
receive and has no record of the September 17th written communication.

However I am not prepared to disbelieve the Union's

testimony that that communication was delivered on that date to
the appropriate office of the Employer.
tion was introduced into evidence.

A copy of that communica-

It is coneivable that that

particular communication was overlooked or went astray.
that circumstance

the September 17th communication

Under

could be

construed as a reiteration of the September 10th notice with a

-3new 5 workday period running from the 17th.

Alternatively, I

conclude that as of September 17th the Union had reasonable
grounds to believe that the Employer was again officially informed
of the Union's intent to arbitrate the grievance and to its
readiness to select an arbitrator for that purpose.

The Union's

failure to submit the FMCS form to the Employer between September
10th and September 17th (as apparently has been the practice in
previous matters) was, in my judgement, a ministerial error, which,
in view of the September 10th notice and my findings in connection
with the September 17th communication, shall not be deemed fatal
to an adjudication of the grievance on the merits.

By September

24th, and with no apparent prejudice to the Employer, the FMCS
form was submitted.
For the foregoing reasons and limited to the particular
circumstances of this case, the Union's grievance on behalf of
Vera Grayson is arbitrable.

DATED: April 14, 1980
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
.

On this fourteenth day of April, 1980 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Lay Faculty Association, Local 1261

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1739 0206 79

and
Diocese of Rockville Centre, Department
of Education

The stipulated issue is:
Did the assignment of Nicholas Velmachos
and Agostino Lari to proctor Regent and
final examinations at St. John The Baptist
and Maria Regina High Schools respectively
during June 1979 violate Article V (Teaching Assignments) Sections B, C, D and E of
the collective bargaining agreement 1977 1979 between the Diocese of Rockville Centre
Department of Education and the Lay Faculty
Association Local 1261? If so what shall be
the remedy?
A hearing was held on December 6, 1979 at which time representatives of the above named Union and Employer appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

Both sides

filed post-hearing briefs.
The case centers on the interpretation of Article V D (5)
of the contract which in pertinent part reads:
Except as otherwise provided herein, nonteaching assignments shall not be given to
one (1) representative of the Association
in each school in order for such representative to attend any Association activity.
This privilege applies to an Association
representative who is carrying a full schedule
of five teaching periods a day0

-2Messrs. Velmachos and Lari were Association representatives
during June of 1979.

Velmachos proctored three final examina-

tions and three Regents examinations that month.
one final examination that month.

Lari proctored

In accordance with the

Employer policy they proctored examinations taken by students
whom they had not instructed during the regular school term.
The parties are in disagreement over whether the proctoring
of final and Regent examinations on the stated basis are "nonteaching assignments" within the meaning of the foregoing
contract section.

The Employer asserts that proctoring is a

natural part and extension of the teaching process and that it
is a regular teaching assignment from which Association representatives are not excused.

It also claims that "non-teaching

assignments" are enumerated in Article V D (1) of the contract,
and as set forth therein are limited to supervision of home room
groups, study halls, and cafeteria assignments.

The Employer

argues that the introductory phrase "except as otherwise provided
herein" in paragraph D (5) must refer back to those assignments
delineated elsewhere in Article V, specifically the supervisory
functions enumerated in D

(1).

The Union relies primarily on the contract negotiations
leading to the current 1977-79 Agreement.

It claims that its

negotiators told the Employer negotiators that the phrase "nonteaching assignments" which was introduced into the contract
for the first time in 1977, included proctoring of Regents and
final examinations as well as the undisputed supervisory duties
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referred to in D (1).

It points out that the supervisory duties

set forth in D (1) were covered and contemplated in the predecessor contract by the general provision in the then Section D
(5) which excused the Association representative from "one
supervisory period per day

"

It asserts that the supervisory

duties of the predecessor contract were perpetuated in the
current contract by enumerating those duties; by removing the
"supervisory" reference from D (5) and placing the reference and
the enumerated duties in Section D (1).

It argues therefore,

that the purpose of adding the phrase "non-teaching

assignments"

in 1977 as a new part of D (5) was to cover assignments beyond
those enumerated as supervisory.
The contractual arguments of the parties notwithstanding,
I find Article V D (5) unclear as to what is meant by "non-teaching assignments."
of that phrase.

The contract contains no specific definition
The interpretations advance by both sides,

though different, are equally logical.
ambiguous.

Hence the phrase is

It makes sense to interpret "non-teaching assignments'

as those specific supervisory duties referred to in D (1).
However because two different phrases are used it makes as much
sense to interpret non-teaching assignments as a new benefit
accorded the Association representative, because it was newly
introduced in the 1977 contract.
Nor am I prepared to say that by customary or traditional
interpretation, "proctoring" is or is not part of the teaching

-4process.

Technically the teaching part of a course is concluded

before the final examination.

The examination is for the purpose

of determining what the student has learned0

On the other hand

the completion of a course by a teacher normally includes giving
and presumably the proctoring of a final examination.

In the

instant case however, the grievants did not proctor their own
students, but by design, were assigned to examinations taken by
students whom they did not teach.

So, I find no help or

resolution in any application of a customary interpretation of
"proctoring".
Considering the lack of clarity of the critical contract
language, the apparent ambiguities, and the plausibility of the
respective arguments, the answer, if there be one, must be found
in what took place during negotiations when the disputed language
was agreed upon.
The evidence in that regard substantially supports the Union's
grievance.

Several Union witnesses who participated in the

negotiations testified unequivocally that the Union repeatedly
informed the Employer representatives that "non-teaching assignments" included proctoring final and Regent examinations as well
as the supervisory duties previously stated.

They further said

that at no time did the Employer negotiators dispute or object
to that as an example of a "non-teaching assignment."
The Employer representatives who participated in the negotiations and who testified at this arbitration were not that
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unequivocal or certain that proctoring had not been cited as an
example of a "'non-teaching assignment."

Those witnesses testified

that they "did not remember" that inclusion, or that the Union
had "not given that example, to the best of their recollection."
I accept the unconditional testimony of the Union witnesses as
accurate.
With this finding, I conclude that during the give and take
of negotiations of 1977 and the discussions between the parties,
particularly the Union's explanations to the Employer as to the
meaning of a "non-teaching assignment", there was a bilateral
agreement that "non-teaching assignments" included the proctoring of final and Regents examinations.

(It should be noted that

this case does not involve the proctoring of regular course
examinations, other than Regents or final exams, given by
teachers to the classes and students which they have taught
during the semester or school year.

The Union does not claim

that those regular and routine examinations are "non-teaching
assignments" within the meaning of D (5).)
Finally the Employer asserts that the purpose of excusing
the Association's rperesentative from "non-teaching

assignments"

is, as the section provides, "in order for such representative
to attend any Association activity."

The Employer points out

that during the period of final and Regents examinations in 1979
there were no "Association activities" and hence D (5) must not
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have been meant to apply to that examination period.
accept that reasoning.

I do not

That there were no Association activities

during that precise period in 1979, does not mean that a schedulec
Association activity was a condition precedent to be excused from
a non-teaching assignment.

Rather I think that the purpose of D

(5) was to give the representative certain time off, during
which he could undertake or complete any of his required duties
or work as a teacher, so that he would have other time available
to participate in an activity of the Association, irrespective
of when the Association activity was scheduled.

For the Employer's

interpretation to prevail the parties would have and should have
written language which expressly conditioned any excusal from a
"non-teaching assignment" on a scheduled Association activity
during the same time.

D (5) falls short of such specificity.

The record is unclear as to whether Mr. Lari qualified under
the foregoing interpretation.

D (5) is applicable to the

Association representative provided he "is carrying a full
schedule of five teaching periods a day."

The evidence appears

to indicate that Mr. Lari's weekly work schedule rotated between
four teaching periods a day one week and five teaching periods
a day the next.

If that is so it would seem that he was not

carrying a full schedule of five teaching periods a day on a
continuing basis, and may not be eligible to be excused from
proctoring the final and Regent examinations even under the

-7interpretation that I have made.

The rights of the parties are

reserved to return the matter to me in the event that there is
a dispute or disagreanent over Mr. Lari's schedule and his
eligibility under D (5).

There is no such problem with Mr.

Velmachos.
The Undersigned duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having been duly sworn and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above named parties makes the following
AWARD:
The assignment of Nicholas Velmachos to
proctor Regent and final examinations at
St. John The Baptist High School during
June 1979 violated Article V (Teaching
Assignments) Section D (5) of the collective
bargaining agreement dated 1977-1979. The
Diocese shall pay Mr. Velmachos for the time
he spent performing that duty at his regular
rate of pay.
It appears that Agostino Lari did not "carry
a full schedule of five teaching periods a
day," and hence was not eligible for the
benefits of Article V D (5).
However the
rights of the parties are reserved to refer
back to this arbitrator any dispute over Mr.
Lari's elgibility, in the event that the
parties are in disagreement over whether
Mr. Lari was carrying a full schedule within
the meaning of Article V D (5).

Eric Jo Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: February 13, 1980
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )
On this thirteenth day of February, 1980 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Ellenville Teachers Association

OPINION AND AWARD
Case-#19 39 0246 79

and
Ellenville Central School District

The stipulated issues are:
1. Did the District violate Section 30.2
of the collective bargaining agreement
when it denied the application of Frank
Hess to attend a conference on November 5
and 6, 1979? If so, what shall be the remedy?
2. What shall be the method for the District
to pay employees who attend conferences under
Section 30.2 of the collective bargaining
agreement, commencing on and after the date
of the Award?
The Association also advanced the following additional issue:
Did the District violate the collective
bargaining agreement in the manner it has
paid employees who have attended conferences from October 26, 1979 to the present?
With regard to the latter issue the District challenges its
arbitrability on the grounds that neither that question nor its
substantive aspects were part of the grievance processed through
the grievance procedure, and that it has been raised by the
Association for the first time at this arbitration hearing.
A hearing was held on June 16, 1980 in Ellenville, New York
at which time Mr. Hess, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant"
and representatives of the above named Association and District
appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer
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evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
The District's claim that the latter aforementioned "issue"
is not arbitrable is affirmed.

Based on the record I conclude

that that question was not part of the "Hess" grievance and was not
raised or discussed in the grievance procedure preliminary to this
arbitration.

It is well settled that issues not processed through

the grievance procedure may not be submitted to arbitration without
the mutual consent of the parties and the same is true when one
side seeks to add issues at the arbitration level.
"issue" falls into both categories.

The latter

It is a new question, albeit

arising out of the same contract provision, and also constitutes an
additional matter which the Association now seeks to arbitrate.

In

neither respect was it subject to the preliminary grievance steps,
nor is there agreement by the District to include it in this
arbitration.
arbitrable.

Therefore the latter "issue" is procedurally not
However, the Association's right to process that ques-

tion as a grievance through the grievance steps of the contract for
subsequent arbitration is expressly reserved.
Section 30.2 of the collective bargaining agreement reads:
Professional Conference Attendance
(a) Teachers are encouraged to take an active
interest in professional meetings. A teacher
who desires to attend a professional conference
will submit his request on the proper form to
the Principal.
(b) Normal expenses and the cost of providing
a substitute for the teacher who attends a conference with the approval of the Board will be
paid by the Board of Education.

-3The grievant requested permission to attend a New York State
Science Teacher's conference scheduled for November 5 and 6, 1979.
The District denied his request because it would not pay his
"normal expenses" connected with attending that conference.

It was

prepared to pay only "the cost of providing a substitute ... " for
the time that the grievant was away.

Technically, it was the posi-

tion of the District that it had no objection to the grievant
attending the conference but that for financial reasons it would
not pay his expenses.

Whether this constituted an express or con-

structive denial of his application is immaterial, because the
grievant and both parties treat it as a denial.
The denial was based on a "policy", enacted by the Board of
Education by resolution in 1975.

That Resolution, 75-134, which

was intended to be applicable for each of the school years 1976-77
through 1979-80, during which time the District operated under
austerity budgets, stipulated the granting of approval to attend
educational conferences:
" ... at no expense to the District other
than the cost of a substitute."
Obviously this policy was based on the District's difficult
financial condition and its lack of funds for collateral activity
during the time that it operated under austerity budgets.

However,

as understandable and as economically justifiable that policy may
be, I find that its unilateral enactment by the Board and its promulgation by the District, without the agreement of the Association,
effectively nullified Section 30.2 of the contract.

The policy

was applicable to all applications to attend educational conferences

-4It meant that no teacher could attend a conference and be reimbursed
for normal expenses incurred.

Its effect was not simply a change

in sub-paragraph (b) of Section 30.2 (by deleting the provision
therein for the payment of "normal expenses") but nullified the
granting of any and all applications.

I am satisfied that the

parties did not negotiate Section 30.2 of the contract to have it
fully nullified or constructively inactivated by any unilateral
policy of the Board.
The record before me shows that the grievant's application
was denied on the basis of the Board's policy.

I do not find that

his application was judged standing alone, or even that it was
denied because at that particular time and under existing circumstances the District did not have the funds to pay both his normal
expenses and the cost of a substitute.

Rather, it was denied by

the automatic application of Board policy.

In the respect that the

Board policy impermissibly nullified a section of the contract on
an overall and all inclusive basis, that policy, and its application to the grievant's request to attend a science teacher's conference, violated the collective bargaining agreement.
This is not to say that the District must approve all requests
to attend otherwise acceptable educational conferences and meetings.
Sub-section (b) clearly provides that normal expenses and the cost
of a substitute will be paid for attendance at "a conference with
the approval of the Board .... " (emphasis added).

That means that

the Board has discretion in approving or disapproving applications.
And, as both parties recognize, only if an application is approved,
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is the District then obligated to pay normal expenses and the cost
of a substitute.
Also it is not to say that the District may not deny a request
on the ground that it does not have sufficient funds to pay "normal
expenses" and/or the cost of a substitute.

Consistent with its

discretionary authority the District should not be foreclosed from
denying a request on bona fide economic grounds.
But in the instant case I do not find that the District denied
the grievant's request on economic grounds expressly and particularly related to his application.

It did not assert or demonstrate

that at that particular time it lacked the funds or could not obtain the funds to reimburse the grievant for his expenses as well
as pay the cost of a substitute.

Rather, irrespective of any

demonstrated contemporaneous economic difficulties, it routinely
and automatically denied the grievant's application, as it would
have with regard to any such request by any other teacher, solely
on the grounds of Board policy.

It is this distinction, which I

believe is a significant difference, which constitutes the
District's contract violation with regard to the grievant's case.
By relying solely on its "blanket" policy the District effectively
took away from the grievant and all other teachers similarly situated the very opportunity which sub-section (a) of Section 30.2
offered - namely the bilaterally negotiated intent:
that teachers are encouraged to take an
active interest in professional meetings.
Section 30.2 juxtaposed with the District's policy is a classical
example of "giving with one hand and taking away with the other."
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But where on a case-by-case basis the District demonstrates a
financial inability to pay both expenses and the cost of a substitute, the District cannot then be contractually faulted in
exercising its discretionary right to deny a teacher's request to
attend a conference.

In short, a demonstrable inability to pay on

a case-by-case basis does not have the same "chilling effect" on a
teacher's interest in professional meetings as does a blanket
District policy which virtually nullifies the attendance at any
such meetings by any teacher even before an application to attend
has been submitted.
With regard to the second issue, both parties have advised
that in the new collective bargaining agreement, and under prospective District policy, a budget has been established to pay both
normal expenses and the cost of a substitute for the attendance of
teachers at professional meetings approved by the District.

This

is a sensible and reasonable approach to reconciling the spirit
and intent of Section 30.2, with the realities of the District's
economic condition.

Within the allotted budget, I presume the

District will approve applications, and for those approved, will
pay both normal expenses and the cost of a substitute.

In my view

that is the way Section 30.2 of the contract should be interpreted,
applied and implemented on and after the date of this Award.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
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1. Because the District denied the application
of Frank Hess to attend a conference on November
5 and 6, 1979 on the basis of a unilaterally promulgated Board policy, the District violated
Section 30.2 of the contract. As Mr. Hess did
not attend the conference, the violation cannot
be remedied retroactively and therefore no remedy
is awarded.
2. From the date of this Award the District shall
pay employees whose attendance at conferences have
been approved by the District their "normal expenses"
as well as assuming the cost of providing a substitute
in accordance with Section 30.2 sub-paragraph (b)
to the extent that funds are available within a
specified budget for that purpose. The parties have
advised that such a budget has been established as
part of the successor collective bargaining agreement.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: August 6, 1980
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York )
On this sixth day of August, 1980, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE,

ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
American Federation of Government
Employees, Local 3483, AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #80K00315

and
Federal Home Loan Bank Board

In accordance with Article XXIX of the collective bargaining agreement dated January 25, 1978 between the above named
Union and Employer, the Undersigned was designated as the
Arbitrator to hear and decide a dispute involving the withdrawal
of a promotion recommendation for the grievant, Douglas Lee.
Hearings were held at the New York City office of the
Employer on March 5, 1980 and June 5, 1980 at which time the
grievant and representatives of the Union and Employer appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to examine and crossexamine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

A steno-

graphic record was taken and the parties filed post-hearing
briefs.
The parties did not agree upon a precisely worded issue.
Based on the record I deem the questions for determination to be:
1. Is the Union's grievance on behalf of
Douglas Lee arbitrable?
2. If so, did the Employer violate the
collective bargaining agreement by withdrawing its recommendation? and
If so, what shall be the remedy?
Issue 1:

THE ARBITRABILITY OF THE GRIEVANCE

Substantive arbitrability is not to be confused with a ruling
on the merits.

A dispute is subs tantively arbitrable so long as
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it involves a claimed misinterpretation or misapplication of a
relevant part of the collective bargaining agreement regardless of
whether such a claim is ultimately sustained on the merits.
Article XXVIII of the Agreement provides in Section 1 that: "This
Article governs grievances over the interpretation or application
of this agreement."

To satisfy this requirement and thus to be

substantively arbitrable, a grievance must bear a legitimate
relationship to or have a reasonable connection with a provision
of the collective bargaining agreement.
The Employer's argument with respect to arbitrability relies
primarily on Section 13 of Executive Order 11491 which limits the
scope of the grievance and arbitration procedure in federal employment.

The Employer maintains that the language in Article

XXVIII Section 1 of the Agreement conforms to the provisions of
the Order by preempting the arbitrator from reviewing the type of
dispute involved in this case.

Article XXVIII Section 1 provides

in pertinent part that:
Matters outside this Agreement, including
matters for which statutory appeals procedures exist, are not covered by this Article
and must be processed in accordance with Civil
Service procedures or other policy. This Article
sets forth the exclusive procedures available
to the parties and Unit employees in resolving
a grievance involving the interpretation or
application of the Agreement.
The Employer argues that a statutory appeal procedure exists
for promotions—as promotions fall within the purview of the
Civil Service Commission and the limitation mandated by the Orderthereby removing such an issue from the Agreement and from the
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jurisdiction of the arbitrator.
The Employer recognizes that the provisions of the Civil
Service Reform Act of 1978 altered the policy of the Federal
government by permitting the scope of grievance procedures to be
broadened and by allowing collective bargaining agreements to be
extended to cover promotions.

Nevertheless, the Employer points

out that the Federal Labor Relations Authority interpreted Section
7135(a)(l) of the Act to continue in full force and effect the
provisions of an existing agreement that conformed to the prior
restrictive policy unless a party to such an agreement raises an
objection and thereby triggers the newly defined policy of the
Act.

See 2 FLRA No. 32 (December 19, 1979).

The Employer argues

that the Union failed to raise an objection to the contents of
the existing Agreement and the Union does not challenge this
assertion.

Under these circumstances it is therefore clear to

me that the limited scope of the grievance

procedure that the

Agreement reflects on its face continues to be applicable.
However, the parties included in their Agreement Article VII
entitled "Merit Promotion Program" which states that: "Promotion
eligibility is based on Civil Service Commission requirements
and the quality of performance at each grade level." (Emphasis
added.)

In my opinion there are two requirements contained in

this provision with respect to the promotion program.

The first

component is that eligibility is based upon Civil Service requirements.

Although the parties did not specify the various require-

ments, the Agreement incorporates them by reference.

Reading
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this provision in tandem with Article XXVIII Section 1 ousts the
Arbitrator of jurisdiction with respect to the Civil Service
procedures because of the exclusive statutory appeal procedure
that exists in this regard.

But the parties did not end their

Agreement concerning promotion eligibility at this point.

Instead,

they expressly provided that a second factor is to be considered
in promotion eligibility, namely, "the quality of performance at
each grade level."

It is this second factor which makes the

instant grievance arbitrable.

The Union is alleging that the

Employer improperly assessed the quality of the grievant's performance and that this improper assesssment, in contravention of
the Agreement, was the basis on which the Employer withdrew its
recommendation for the grievant's promotion.

In short, the

Union asserts that the Employer applied Article VIII improperly;
that it resulted in the withdrawal of the promotion recommendation and as such violated the Agreement.

I conclude that the

claim of the Union bears a reasonable relationship to this provision of the Agreement, that the grievance is therefore sounded
in contract breach, and on this basis is arbitrable.
THE MERITS OF THE GRIEVANCE
The grievant's classification of Savings and Loan Examiner
is covered by the Career Ladder Promotion Policy.

Under this

plan an employee is promoted periodically when the performance
of the employee conforms to certain predetermined standards. In
the case of the grievant, the disputed action concerns eligibility
for a promotion to a General Schedule Grade Level 12 position
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from a Grade Level 11 position.

It is undisputed that the

appropriate officials of the District Two Office of the Employer
had decided in April 1979 to recommend the grievant for a promotion and sent the necessary paperwork in support of this personne
action to the Washington, B.C. office of the Employer.

On June

21, 1979 Assistant District Director Clifford C. Hebbeler telephoned the Washington office and requested that the recommendation
be withdrawn.

The Washington office complied with the request.

I find that the events which occurred during the interval
between the recommendation of the promotion and its withdrawal
support the Employer's conclusion that the grievant's quality of
performance during that time frame triggered a circumstance inconsistent with the recommendation. I further find that the
Employer had the right, under these circumstances to cancel the
promotion.

As for evaluating the quality of performance, I

conclude that the assessment of the quality of performance in
the exercise of managerial authority, must be reasonable.

It also

means that the Employer will not be arbitrary, capricious, or
discriminatory in evaluating the quality of performance.

A

failure to comport with this standard would make this language
of the Agreement a nullity.
The Employer predicates its action on the events surrounding
the grievant's absence from work on June 18, 19, and 20, 1979.
The Employer claims that the grievant's failure to obtain advance
permission to be absent on June 18, coupled with his additional
absences on June 19 and June 20 interfered with the conduct of
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an examination at the Highland Falls Federal Savings and Loan
Association.

Based upon this incident the Employer concluded

that the grievant had reverted to his prior pattern of work
habits and administrative deficiencies concerning annual leave,
administrative leave, and overhead time.

The facts of that

"pattern" are essentially undisputed and familiar to the parties
and need not be recited herein.

The Union denies the materiality

of the prior conduct and claims that it is in large part stale.
With respect to the June 18-20 incident, the Union insists that
the grievant had secured advance annual leave and that the
ultimate approval of annual leave for the days in question supports
the legitimate and bona fide nature of that leave.
The allegation concerning the grievant's failure to obtain
advance approval for his absence on June 18 arises from disputed
versions of a telephone conversation between the grievant and the
Assignment Desk Officeij Steven Simone.

The Employer credited

Simone's version of the telephone conversation on June 14 to the
effect that the grievant had merely indicated that he was considering requesting annual leave for June 18.

Based on the evidence

before me, including the testimony of the grievant and Simone,
I do not find the Employer's conclusion about what was said was
illogical, unreasonable or incorrect.
It is well settled that an employer has a right to insist
upon regular attendance by its employees and that chronic absenteeism, does not have to be Vdef iiiitel / tolerated by an employer
and may furnish the basis
to and including discharge.

.or appro^-jat .„ disciplinary action up
Although this is not a disciplinary

case, it is reasonable for the Employer to evaluate the grievant's

-7attendance to establish his suitability for a promotion.

Absences

interrupt the normal activities of the Employer in conducting
examinations and unpredictable absences accentuate this problem,
especially as an employee attains a higher rank and is entrusted
with more responsibility.

When the June 1979 absences are juxta-

posed against the previous record of the grievant, it was not unreasonable for the Employer to conclude that the grievant was reverting to a pattern of conduct that he had assured the Employer
would not recur.

In my opinion the grievant knew and recognized

the relevance of a satisfactory attendance record as a condition
to a promotion.

Nor do I consider the reference to a prior pattern

of conduct to be inappropriate.

That prior conduct had not pre-

cluded the grievant from the promotion recommendation, since the
Employer had relied upon the grievant's expressed assurances that
his future conduct would improve.

The June events, however, demon-

strated to the Employer that the grievant would not or could not
live up to his assurances.
That the absences may have been "approved" later does not
mean that permission to be absent was requested and granted at the
critical time.

The later approval may be a defense to a discipli-

nary action, a matter not involved in this case, but it does not
mean that the Employer may not consider those absences, against a
backdrop of the grievant's prior record, as an impediment to a
promotion.
On that basis the nexus between the June events and the
grievant's earlier record is relevant and the Employer's consideration of both jointly, was not unfair or unreasonable, and certainly
not arbitrary or capricious.
The Union has raised several additional allegations

concern-

ing claimed violations of the Agreement by the Employer in connection with the withdrawal of the promotion recommendation.

First,
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as I have concluded that the Employer's action was not arbitrary,
capricious, or discriminatory, it follows that the Employer did
not violate the requirement of Article II Section 6 "to provide
for a safe, wholesome, and healthful work environment, both mental
and physical" even assuming arguendo that this provision was
meant to apply to the impact of a personnel action on an employee's
work environment.

Second, my finding of substantive arbitrability

obviates any further analysis of the claim by the Union regarding
Article III Section 2 concerning "the employees' right to express
dissatisfaction concerning procedures used by the Employer in
the exercise of its rights" even assuming arguendo that this
provision was meant to apply to the impact on an employee of a
personnel action.

Third, the Union asserts that the Employer

failed to afford the grievant the presence of a Union representative

during a counselling session on June 21, 1979 as required

under Article III Section 4A.

Based on the evidence in the recorc

the Union failed to meet its burden of proof on this point.

I

find particularly convincing the grievant's memorandum dated June
25, 1979 (Union Exhibit 9,) which states: "Mr. Nightingale
indicated that if I felt the need for a union rperesentative it
would not be appropriate to continue the discussion."

Fourth,

the claim by the Union that the Employer violated Article XX
Section 3F by failing to provide advance notice of an assignment
requiring overnight lodging is not substantiated.

In light of

the circumstances surrounding the reassignment of the grievant
from the Highland Falls Federal Savings and Loan Association to

-9the Pioneer Savings and Loan Association in Brooklyn, New York,
it is clear that the Employer did not have "sufficient prior
knowledge" as specified as the condition precedent to providing
five business days advance notice to the grievant.

Fifth, the

contention of the Union that Article XXII Section 4 requires that
"disciplinary actions will be taken only for just and sufficient
cause" is inapplicable since the instant case is not a disciplinary action.
Lastly, I am unpersuaded by the argument advanced by the
Union that the Employer was as a matter of law precluded from
withdrawing the promotion recommendation after having processed
it to the Washington office.

The parties are well aware of the

many levels of review that such recommendations pass through before
the recommendation is converted into an approved action.

There is

no evidence in the record that a recommended promotion may not be
retracted before becoming final.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named parties,
makes the following AWARD:
The grievance of Douglas Lee is arbitrable.
The Employer did not violate the contract
by withdrawing the recommendation for Mr.
Lee's promotion.

DATED: September 30, 1980
New York )
), S • ..
STATE OF
OF New
COUNTY OF New York )'

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

On this 30th day of September, 1980 before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
OPINION AND AWARD
Case #79K/20585

Frito-Lay, Inc.
and
Bakery Drivers Local Union No. 802
IBT

The stipulated issue is:
Does Management have the right to demand
and receive copies of sales ticket receipts
given to cash paying customers?
Hearings were held on January 1, and 24, 1980 at which
time representatives of the above named Company and Union
appeared, and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The

The parties filed post-hearing

briefs.
The Company's requirement that its sales route drivers
complete and turn in to the Company, copies of cash sales
receipts, is a proper exercise of a Company managerial right,
unrestricted by the contract.

The Company has shown to my

satisfaction that it has a legitimate business need for those
receipts, both for accounting purposes and for the discovery
and correction of errors.

The sales receipt forms, of which

the cash sales receipt is a part, are official Company documents
and records, utilized by the Company and its sales route drivers

-2-

in the regular conduct of the Company's business.

As other

parts of the sales receipt forms are turned in to the Company
by the drivers, so too does the Company have the right to
require the drivers to turn in the cash sales receipt part
thereof.
Accordingly the Undersigned, duly designated as the
Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above named parties, makes the following AWARD:
The Company has the right to demand
and receive copies of sales ticket
receipts given to cash paying customers.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: May 3, 1980
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY of New York ) ss - :
On this third day of May, 1980, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
International Brotherhood of
Painters and Allied Trades Local
1503, Metal Trades Council of
New London County, AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #PA9-9

and
General Dynamics Corporation,
Electric Boat Division

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the five day
suspension of John Preble? If not what
shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Groton, Connecticut on June 17, 1980
at which time Mr. Preble, hereinafter referred to as the grievant,
and representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared.
All concerned were offered full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

A steno-

graphic record was taken and the Company filed a post-hearing
memorandum.
Pertinent to this case is a portion of an Agreement between
the parties dated May 10, 1979.

The relevant parts of Section B

thereof read:
B.

Disciplinary Action - Alcohol

The Employer and the Union agree to the
following guidelines for disciplinary action
to be administered in cases where employees
have violated any of the following Company
rules and regulations:
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3.

Being under the influence of alcoholic
beverages and unfit for work while on
Company premises.

If an employee has committed any of the above
violations, the following disciplinary action
shall be taken:
1.

For a first offense: Five (5) days suspension without pay.

The narrow question in this case is whether the grievant
was "under the influence of alcoholic beverages and unfit for
work while on Company premises."
mandates a five day suspension.

If so the foregoing Agreement
If not the suspension should be

reversed.
Out of the considerable contradictory evidence presented
in this case, I conclude that the testimony of the Company's
Supervisor of Medical Services, Rosemarie L0 Pusateri was credible,
accurate and unbiased.
Ms. Pusateri is a registered nurse.

I believe she knows

an alcoholic breath when she smells it and can distinguish the
smell of alcohol from the smell of a cough drop.

I believe she

knows when both eyes of a person are blood shot and glassy from
the effects of alcohol and can distinguish that condition from
the mistiness of a single eye that comes from an eye operation.
I believe she can detect slurred speech and unsteady gait and can
make a determination when those conditions are due to the effect
of alcohol.

In short, based on her professional medical training

I conclude that she accurately determined that the grievant had

-3been drinking and was under the influence of alcohol when he was
examined for a hand injury during the course of his shift.
No doubt the Company's case would have been more unassailable had the other nurse and a medical technician who had observed
the grievant also testified, and had the Company used some other
testing method to determine whether the grievant was intoxicated
or unfit for duty when the breathometer test failed (for whatever reason).

But though this additional evidence and testimony,

if offered and if supportive of the Company's case, would have
added conclusiveness to the charge against the grievant, I find
that in this case the nurse's testimony is enough to meet the
Company's burden of proving the allegation by evidence that is
clear and convincing.
The Union failed to show any bias, prejudice or retaliatory
motive on the part of Ms. Pusateri.

The various suggestions that

in some way she falsified or misreported the grievant's condition
out of personal animosity or revenge, was in no way supported by
probative evidence.

Indeed I find no reason in the record why

Ms. Pusateri would falsify or inaccurately report what she observed.

I conclude that her observations were accurate, and that

her diagnosis that the grievant had been drinking and was unfit
for duty was correct.
Those witnesses who testified otherwise were not, in my
view, objective about the grievant's condition, nor did they
possess the scientific and medical training upon which the nurse's
assessment of the grievant's condition was made.
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For the foregoing reasons, the Undersigned duly designated
as the Arbitrator, and having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named parties makes the following AWARD:

The five day suspension of John Preble
was for just cause.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: July 1, 1980
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York) ' " "
On this first day of July, 1980, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be
the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Associa tion of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers, Local Lodge 1871
AFL-CIO
and

OPINION AND AWARD
Grievances M-7-9
and M-8-9

General Dynamics Corporation
Electric Boat Division

The stipulated issue is:
On July 27 and August 3, 1979 did nonbargaining unit supervisory employees
perform the work of welding machine repair mechanics and thereby violate Article
II of the collective bargaining agreement?
If so, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Groton, Connecticut on October 8,
1980 at which time representatives of the above named Union
and Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full oppor-

tunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crossexamine witnesses.

A stenographic record was taken and the

parties filed post-hearing briefs.
Article II reads:
NON-BARGAINING UNIT EMPLOYEES
Non-Bargaining unit employes, including supervisory employes, shall not perform work on any
hourly rated jobs listed in Appendix A except
in the instruction or training of employes.
It is also undisputed that bargaining unit repair mechanics
have the responsibility "for the issue, return, care and repair"
of pre-heat torches.
The issue is simply whether non-bargaining unit supervisory
employees "issued" or "cared" for the pre-heat torches within
the proscription of Article II, or within the meaning of the
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job duties of the bargaining unit repair mechanics.

I conclude

they did not.
I find no contractual provision which requires that preheat torches used on a given day or shift be returned to the
tool shed at the end of that day or shift.

Nor do I find any

contract bar to a supervisory decision to keep those torches
out overnight after the conclusion of their use one day, for
use the next day.
Here, the torches were properly issued by the repair
mechanics to the welders from the tool shed, on the Fridays,
July 27th and August 3rd, 1979.

At the end of those days or the

shifts on those days, the torches were not returned to the tool
shed.

Instead, as perceived to be their instructions

from

supervision, the welders put the torches in the office of the
welding supervisor, where the torches remained overnight.

The

next day (Saturdays, July 28th and August 4th) supervision
distributed the torches to welders called in on those days, for
production use.
In the absence of a requirement that the torches be returned
to the tool shed each day, I cannot find that their retention
out of the tool shed for use on two consecutive days, their
storage overnight in the supervisor's office, or their distribution for use the next day constituted an issuance or care of
the torches by supervision within the meaning of bargaining unit
work or within the prohibitions of Article II.
As I see it the torches were properly issued by the repair
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mechanic on the Fridays, July 27th and August 3rd.

Thereafter,

they were not issued again on the Saturdays, but rather retained
for operational use for the next consecutive day.

The Union has

not shown that the torches are to be checked mechanically, or
for safety, or for repair each day at the end of one day's use,
nor is there evidence that any of the torches in question required
any specific repair or other attention on the Fridays involved.
I construe the duty of "care" to pertain to such work, and
distinguish it from "custody."
vision maintained

And it is "custody" that super-

over the torches from the end of the day

Friday, to the start of the shift on Saturday.
As I have said, I find no contract or operational bar to
this, and neither should be constructed

from the bare distri-

bution of the torches on the second day by supervision, after
storage overnight in the supervisor's office.

On the other hand,

the result might well be different if there was a contractual
safety, mechanical or repair reason why the torches must be
returned to the tool shed after each day's use or if the particular torches in question should have been returned for those
reasons. But a case on the latter point was not developed as
part of this grievance.
Alternatively the evidence indicates that supervision
thought the facts to be different than what happened, and were more
in accord with the Union's position in this case.

It appears

that supervision gave instructions that at the end of either or
both of the Fridays, new and different torches were to be drawn

-4from the tool shed (i.e. issued by the repair mechanics), to
then be stored overnight in the supervisor's office for distribution to welders the next day.

If that had been done the set

of torches used on Saturday would indeed have been torches
issued by the bargaining unit repair mechanics for the specific
and first use on Saturday.

(And under that circumstance the

torches used on Friday would have been turned in and replaced
or reissued by the mechanic for Saturday use.) It would have
been a new issue, different from the issuance at the start of
the day on Friday for Friday use.

As there is nothing I find

in the contract or in practice which would bar the issuance of
torches at the end of one day for use the next day, those
circumstances, which supervision had reasonable grounds to believe
were the facts in the instant case, would not be actionable by
the Union.

Hence I cannot conclude that supervision attempted

or intended to by-pass or usurp the duty of the repair mechanic
to "issue" the torches.

(There is no dispute that after that

use on the Saturdays the torches were properly returned to the
tool shed.)
It should be obvious that this determination is confined
to the facts and equipment involved in this case.

It may not be

construed as a license for management to circumvent the overtime,
provisions of the contract by having supervisory employees perform work within the job duties of a bargaining unit classification.

The contract prohibition on such action is clear.

Here

I have only concluded that what is complained of was an operational procedure, not bargaining unit work within the meaning
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of Article II or the repair mechanic job duties.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
On July 27 and August 3, 1979, non-bargaining unit supervisory employees did not perform the work of welding machine repair
mechanics. The Company did not violate
Article II of the collective bargaining
agreement.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: December 1, 1980

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers, Local Lodge 1871
AFL-CIO
and

OPINION AND AWARD
Grievances M-7-9
and M-8-9

General Dynamics Corporation
Electric Boat Division

The stipulated issue is:
On July 27 and August 3, 1979 did nonbargaining unit supervisory employees
perform the work of welding machine repair mechanics and thereby violate Article
II of the collective bargaining agreement?
If so, what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Groton, Connecticut on October 8,
1980 at which time representatives of the above named Union
and Company appeared.

All concerned were afforded full oppor-

tunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crossexamine witnesses.

A stenographic record was taken and the

parties filed post-hearing briefs.
Article II reads:
NON-BARGAINING UNIT EMPLOYEES
Non-Bargaining unit employes, including supervisory employes, shall not perform work on any
hourly rated jobs listed in Appendix A except
in the instruction or training of employes.
I

It is also undisputed that bargaining unit repair mechanics
have the responsibility "for the issue, return, care and repair"
of pre-heat torches.
The issue is simply whether non-bargaining unit supervisory
employees "issued" or "cared" for the pre-heat torches within
the proscription of Article II, or within the meaning of the
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job duties of the bargaining unit repair mechanics.

I conclude

they did not.
I find no contractual provision which requires that preheat torches used on a given day or shift be returned to the
tool shed at the end of that day or shift.

Nor do I find any

contract bar to a supervisory decision to keep those torches
out overnight after the conclusion of their use one day, for
use the next day.
Here, the torches were properly issued by the repair
mechanics to the welders from the tool shed, on the Fridays,
July 27th and August 3rd, 1979.

At the end of those days or the

shifts on those days, the torches were not returned to the tool
shed.

Instead, as perceived to be their instructions from

supervision, the welders put the torches in the office of the
f

welding supervisor, where the torches remained overnight.

The

next day (Saturdays, July 28th and August 4th) supervision
distributed the torches to welders called in on those days, for
production use.
In the absence of a requirement that the torches be returned
to the tool shed each day, I cannot find that their retention
out of the tool shed for use on two consecutive days, their
storage overnight in the supervisor's office, or their distribution for use the next day constituted an issuance or care of
the torches by supervision within the meaning of bargaining unit
work or within the prohibitions of Article II.
As I see it the torches were properly issued by the repair

-3mechanic on the Fridays, July 27th and August 3rd.

Thereafter,

they were not issued again on the Saturdays, but rather retained
for operational use for the next consecutive day.

i
The Union has !
i

not shown that the torches are to be checked mechanically, or
for safety, or for repair each day at the end of one day's use,
nor is there evidence that any of the torches in question requires
any specific repair or other attention on the Fridays involved.
I construe the duty of "care" to pertain to such work, and
distinguish it from "custody."

And it is "custody" that super-

vision maintained over the torches from the end of the day
Friday, to the start of the shift on Saturday.
As I have said, I find no contract or operational bar to
this, and neither should be constructed from the bare distribution of the torches on the second day by supervision, after
storage overnight in the supervisor's office.

On the other hand,

the result might well be different if there was a contractual
safety, mechanical or repair reason why the torches must be
returned to the tool shed after each day's use or if the particular torches in question should have been returned for those
reasons. But a case on the latter point was not developed as
part of this grievance.
Alternatively the evidence indicates that supervision
thought the facts to be different than what happened, and were moi
in accord with the Union's position in this case.

It appears

I
that supervision gave instructions that at the end of either or
both of the Fridays, new and different torches were to be drawn

-4from the tool shed (i.e. issued by the repair mechanics), to
then be stored overnight in the supervisor's office for distribution to welders the next day.

If that had been done the set

of torches used on Saturday would indeed have been torches
issued by the bargaining unit repair mechanics for the specific
and first use on Saturday.

(And under that circumstance the

torches used on Friday would have been turned in and replaced
or reissued by the mechanic for Saturday use.) It would have
been a new issue, different from the issuance at the start of
the day on Friday for Friday use.

As there is nothing I find

in the contract or in practice which would bar the issuance of
torches at the end of one day for use the next day, those
circumstances, which supervision had reasonable grounds to believ
were the facts in the instant case, would not be actionable by
the Union.

Hence I cannot conclude that supervision attempted

or intended to by-pass or usurp the duty of the repair mechanic
to "issue" the torches.

(There is no dispute that after that

use on the Saturdays the torches were properly returned to the
tool shed.)
It should be obvious that this determination is confined
to the facts and equipment involved in^this case.

It may not be

construed as a license for management to circumvent the overtime
provisions of the contract by having supervisory employees perform work within the job duties of a bargaining unit classification.

The contract prohibition on such action is clear.

Here

I have only concluded that what is complained of was an operational procedure, not bargaining unit work within,the meaning
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of Article II or the repair mechanic job duties.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
On July 27 and August 3, 1979, non-bargaining unit supervisory employees did not perform the work of welding machine repair
mechanics. The Company did not violate
Article II of the collective bargaining
agreement.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: December 1, 1980

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION,

ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
IUE, Radio & Machine Workers Local
301, AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #15 30 0591 79

and
General Electric Company

This is an expedited case pursuant to Article XV Section
8 (a) of the 1976-1979 GE - IUE National Agreement.
The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the warning
notice and one week disciplinary suspension issued Bruce Davis? If not
what shall be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Schenectady, New York on May 14, 1980
at which time Mr. Davis, hereinafter referred to as the grievant
and representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The

The parties filed post-hearing

briefs.
The grievant is an Anneal Enamel Furnace Operator working
on what is known as the "process line."

On Wednesday, June 20,

1979 he worked his usual 3 PM to 11 PM second shift.

Because of

an anticipated absence on the third shift the grievant was
instructed by his foreman Gerald O'Brien to shut down the line
and secure it.

To do so requires about an hour and half of

various shutdown activities on the many component parts of the
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machinery which make up the process line.

It is a procedure

which the grievant performs normally every Friday evening.

The

grievant left work at the conclusion of his shift at 11 PM on
June 20th.
At about 2 AM Thursday, June 21, two members of supervision
found the rubber-covered applicator rollers of the process line
running "dry" in a closed or together position.

As a result the

rubber rollers were torn apart and ultimately had to be replaced
at considerable expense.

All other parts of the process line

had been shut down.
The Company blames the grievant for failing to shut down
the applicator rollers.

It asserts that under the particular

facts present the logical conclusion, based on circumstantial
evidence is that the grievant negligently failed to shutdown
that part of the process line and that discipline is warranted.
As this was the grievant's third warning within a specified
period, it automatically carried with it a one week disciplinary
suspension in accordance with the Company's progressive discipline
procedures.
The grievant and the Union on his behalf deny that the
applicator rollers were not shutdown and secured before the
grievant completed his shift on June 20th.

They argue that the

grievant is familiar with what is required; that he performs the
shutdown operation normally each week; that between 11 PM and

-32 AM other persons in the plant could have activated the rollers
(inadvertently or maliciously); that at the time there was some
horseplay going on in the plant and that the reactivation of
the rollers between 11 PM and 2 AM could have been another such
act; that activation of the rollers could be achieved simply by
pressing a button; and that therefore the grievant cannot be
held responsible.
If the foregoing was all there was to this case I would
have some doubts as to whether the Company had met its burden
in a disciplinary case of establishing liability or guilt by
clear, persuasive or convincing evidence.

I am inclined to accord

credit to the Company's assertion that a reactivation of the
applicator rollers is not comparable to incidents of horseplay;
that it is not simply a matter of pressing a button but rather
requires some specialized knowledge of the operation of the
process line; and that the few employees who were in the plant
from 11 PM to 2 AM did not possess the knowledge or skill to
start up the applicator rollers.

However, my inclination not-

withstanding, I am not persuaded that this is enough to foreclose
the possibility of mischief sometime between 11 PM and 2 AM or
a non-willful activation

of the rollers by someone else unknow-

ingly or negligently, after they had been closed down by the
grievant.

However I find that I need not resolve the dispute

based solely on the foregoing facts, and hence need not deal with
the question of whether circumstantial evidence in general or
more specifically in this case, points with sufficient
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conclusiveness to the grievant's responsibility or falls short
of any such logical or inferential

conclusion.

There is one additional piece of evidence which I conclude
is dispositive of this case despite its controversial aspects.
That evidence is the testimony of Foreman O'Brien that in a
telephone conversation with the grievant on June 25th in which
O'Brien told the grievant of the damage to the applicator rollers,
the grievant responded "it was my mistake and I am sorry about
that."

This testimony is supported by O'Brien's written state-

ment dated June 25th, which O'Brien testified he made immediately
after that telephone conversation.
The testimony and the statement (Company Exhibit #7) are
controversial because the record discloses that the grievant's
alleged "admission" was not made known to the Union in the course
of the grievance procedure in this matter nor was Company Exhibit
7 provided the Union during the grievance steps.

Indeed, that

part of O'Brien's testimony and his statement became known to
the Union for the first time at the arbitration hearing.

The

Union strenuously argues that because such a critical matter was
not disclosed prior to the arbitration hearing, it should not be
believed, and at least lacks probative value.
It is well settled, good personnel practices and labor
relations aside, that evidence bearing on the issue in dispute
may be offered by either party for the first time at the
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arbitration hearing.

Such evidence is admissible.

No doubt,

good personnel practices and constructive labor relations
policies would be furthered if all relevant evidence were made
known by each side to the other during the grievance procedure.
That way a dispute is given every chance at resolution prior
to arbitration, and neither side is surprised by unknown or
unfamiliar evidence when and if an arbitration hearing is held.
But what may constitute good procedural practices does not bear
on the validity or probative value of any such evidence offered
for the first time at the arbitration hearing.

Here the Company

has offered an acceptable explanation as to why this part of
O'Brien's testimony was not disclosed to the Union during the
grievance step.

Apparently the grievance meeting was highly

charged, and ended abruptly on an angry note before all the
facts or allegations could be disclosed.

More important however

on the question of the believability of O'Brien's testimony is
whether O'Brien would have any reason to fabricate what he states
the grievant told him or any reason to bear false witness in the
arbitration hearing.

Though the Union raised certain suggestions

of bias on O'Brien's part towards the grievant, I cannot find
that those examples support a charge that O'Brien would lie in
such a critical and determinative respect.

Therefore, I accept

O'Brien's testimony as credible and accurate and conclude that
in his telephone conversation with the grievant a few days after
the incident, the grievant made a statement acknowledging his
responsibility

for failing to shut down and secure the applicator
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rollers.

This critical evidence is sufficiently supportive of

the balance of the Company's circumstantial case to meet the
requisite standard of proof in disciplinary cases.

Accordingly

the grievance is denied.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties, makes the following AWARD:
There was just cause for the warning
notice and one week disciplinary suspension issued Bruce Davis.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: July 22, 1980
STATE OF New York )ss .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this twenty second day of July, 1980, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J, Schmertz to me known
and known to me to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to me
that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Union of Electrical
Radio and Machine Workers, AFL-CIO
CLC, Local 191 (Rome, Ga.)

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #3030 0115 79

and
General Electric Company

As amended at the hearing, the stipulated issue is:
1. Did the grievants, Guy Stanley and
Paul Dyer, have the minimum qualifications required under the provisions of
the second sentence of Section 1 of
Article XXVIII to be upgraded to the
R-22 Boiler House Assistant Operator
job on April 10, 1978?
2. If the Arbitrator determines that
either one or more of the grievants did
have the minimum qualifications required
for such upgrading, did the Company violate Article XXVIII when it upgraded
Eugene T. Autry to the position? If so,
what shall the remedy be?
After the hearing and the submission of briefs in this matter
the original arbitrator Howard W. Kleeb died.

By agreement of the

parties the entire record, together with supplemental briefs and
other material were submitted to me for decision on the aforesaid
issue.
As I did not directly hear or observe the witnesses, did not
receive or rule on exhibits and other evidence, and did not direct
ly hear the respective arguments, this is not the appropriate case
for me to consider reconsidering my prior ruling on the interpretation of Article XXVIII, Section 1 of the contract.

-2However, within the meaning of my prior decisions I conclude
that in the instant case the Company's determination that the
grievants Guy Stanley and Paul Dyer were not minimally qualified
to be considered for an upgrade to the job R22 Boiler House
Assistant Operator, was an abuse of its discretion.
Not having taken steps over the several years since the
promulgation of its Minimum Job Requirements for the job of Boiler
House Assistant Operator to correct what the Company now claims
to be a clerical error (e.g. the Company's assertion that Code 121
set forth therein should have been Code 120 requiring industrial
or maritime boiler house operator's experience, 3 years or more,
as a mimimum requirement) the Company is estopped from attempting
to do so in this proceeding.

At no time prior to this hearing

since the promulgation of the list of Minimum Job Requirements in
April, 1973 did the Company by notice to the Union or by the issuance
of a new list of Requirements or in any other way claim that the
Code 121 reference (which the parties stipulated at the hearing
was not applicable to the job in question) was erroneously listed
and should have been Code 120.

Absent any effort to correct what

it now claims was an error, the grievants and the Union on their
behalf

had no reason to know or believe that "industrial or

maritime boiler house operator" experience was a minimum requirement.
The record before me discloses that the Company made critical
use of that previously undisclosed requirement in disqualifying the
grievants from consideration for the upgrading and indeed judged
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the grievants not to be minimally qualified because they did not
have prior experience with boilers.

I consider the Company's

action in that regard and under that circumstance to be an abuse
of discretion.
This is not to say that the Company may not prospectively
require Code 120 experience as a minimum requirement.

I need not

make that determination one way or the other in this proceeding
and the rights of the parties on that question are expressly
reserved.

Rather it is to say that in the absence of fundamental

notice of a claimed error and with the passage of years in its
original promulgated form (without reference to Code 120) the
Company may not ask in this proceeding that that Code reference
be read into the Requirements, or that the Requirements now'be
reformed.

And it may not in this case impose that claimed require-

ment on the grievants in assessing their minimum qualifications.
Also, based on the record I conclude that the interviews of
the grievants by Foremen Jones and Ayers were at the same time
both superficial and too demanding.

The interviews were superficial

because the foremen neither referred to nor appeared to know of
the existence of the list of Minimum Job Requirements nor did they
inquire of the grievants about any of the conditions listed therein.

Instead as the evidence shows they were concerned exclusively

with whether the grievants had prior experience with boilers.

The

interviews were too demanding because, again based on their testimony the foremen were looking for an applicant who was qualified
to "work alone" on the boilers, who was "fully qualified" on

-4boilers and who presumably was interchangeable with the Boiler
House Operator.

By doing this, it appears to me and I conclude

that what the Company sought (through the foremen as its agents)
was a candidate qualified for the higher rated job of Boiler House
Operator, forgetting or ignoring the fact that the job in question
was that of Assistant Operator and that the job description for
that job specified that the incumbent is to "assist" not replace
the Boiler House Operator.

By looking for qualifications more

related to the senior position in judging whether the grievants
were minimally qualified for the junior post, the Company abused
its discretion within the meaning of my prior Award interpreting
Article XXVIII Section 1.
Based on the record I am satisfied that both grievants met
the minimum requirements set forth in the list of Minimum Job
Requirements as promulgated by the Company and as in fioree and
effect since April 1973.

Therefore both grievants should have

been found to be minimally qualified and the Company's failure
to do so was for the reasons stated, an abuse of discretion.
With that ruling I set aside the Company's selection of
Mr. Eugene Autry for the job in question.

I choose not to decide

the second part of the stipulated issue at this time but instead
I remand the matter to the parties.

The Company is directed to

make a de novo determination among the two grievants and Mr. Autry
as to which should be upgraded to the job of Boiler House Assistant
Operator in accordance with the provision of the second sentence
of Article XXVIII Section 1.

In doing so, as that Section requires,

the Company shall "take into consideration as an important factor
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the relative length of continuous service" of all three said employees.

The de novo selection should be completed within ten

(10) days following receipt of this Award. The contractual rights
of the parties with regard to this new selection process are expressly reserved.

Unless the parties mutually agree otherwise I shall retain
jurisdiction in this matter for the application and implementation
of the aforegoing, to decide disputes which may arise therefrom,
for determination of remedies if any, and for further proceedings
as may be necessary.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: October 20, 1980
STATE OF New York )
'a c
COUNTY OF New York )

•

On this 20th day of October, 1980, before me personally came
and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to be the
individualdescribed in and who executed the foregoing instrument
and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Union of Electrical, Radio
and Machine Workers, Local 380 AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #15 30 0640 79

and
General Electric Company
Silicone Products Division

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discipline
imposed on 49 identified employees for
their conduct on June 7 and 8, 1979,
which the Company alleges was in violation of Article XIV, Section 1 of the
Agreement? If not what shall the remedy
be?
A hearing was held on May 5, 1980 in Latham, New York at
which time representatives of the above named Company and Union
appeared.

All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer

evidence and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

Both sides filed post-hearing

briefs.
The Company imposed one day suspensions on the 49 grievants
for their failure or refusal on June 7 and 8, 1979 to cross the
"wildcat" strike picket line of a sister union, Local 359, in
violation of the "no strike" provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.
The issue is a narrow one.

There is no dispute that if the

grievants failed or refused to come to work out of sympathy for
and support of the strike by members of Local 359, they would be
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in violation of Article XIV Section 1 of the contract.

On the

other hand it is equally clear that if any or all the grievants
had bona fide grounds to believe that to cross the picket line
would subject them to physical harm from the strikers, their failure or refusal to come to work would be excused.
It is the Union's contention that the Company failed to
provide the non-striking employees with "safe access" to the plant;
that the circumstances were realistically threatening to the
physical safety of non-striking employees, including the grievants,
and that the disciplinary suspensions were therefore improper.
It is well settled that employees who are bound to report
to work as scheduled and foreclosed from engaging in or supporting
strikes or walkouts, may not respect a picket line and refuse or
fail to report to work simply because they think it might be
physically hazardous for them to cross the picket line.

Instead,

to enjoy immunity from discipline it must be established not just
that they were afraid, but that the external circumstances were
such as to make their fears realistic and reasonable.

In the

instant case, with the exception of grievant Patricia Fox, I do
not find that those essential circumstances have been established.
Ms. Fox's testimony that she was directly and personally
threatened by one or more of the strikers stands unrefuted.

Under

that circumstance, though I do not conclude that she would have
been harmed had she attempted to report for work, I do conclude
that she had reasonable grounds to be afraid and hence was justified in not reporting to work.
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However, based on the record I cannot find similar conditions
applying to the balance of the grievants.
sonally or directly threatened.

None of them were per-

The record is devoid of any

evidence that any employee who reported to work or attempted to
report was physically harmed or even physically threatened.

In-

deed, 77 members of the Union in the technician classification
(the same bargaining unit as the grievants) reported to work and
went in and out of the plant without incident.

Additionally, it

has been shown that the picketing was limited to certain sections
of the plant and that there were a number of accessible entrances
and exits at which there were no strikers and through which the
grievants could have entered and left the plant without undue
burden.

In fact some of those unpicketed entrances were the same

entrances which some of the grievants customarily used.
I agree with the Union that the Company acted unwisely and
imprudently in failing to remove the strikers from within the
Company's yard and by permitting them to remain and even drink
beer on the premises.

I agree that the Company's failure to

promptly remove the strikers could be an intimidating factor to
non-striking employees.

But on balance I am persuaded that any

such potential intimidation was at least neutralized by the total
lack of difficulty 77 employees had in coming to work; by the
absence, except for the case of Ms. Fox, of any direct or personal
threats to any of the other grievants; by the absence of any incidence of personal physical violence; and by the apparent availability of law enforcement authorities to insure safe entrance and
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exit had the grievants wished to work as scheduled.
That there was property damage, including damage to cars
of some employees is a serious and disturbing matter.

However,

property damage is not the same as or evidence of a threat of
personal harm or potential personal danger.
A one day disciplinary suspension is a moderate if not light
penalty for a violation of the relevant contract provision.

There-

fore I cannot find that it is either too harsh or inappropriate
simply because the strikers, engaged in an illegal strike, received
the same penalty.

That the latter group might have been properly

disciplined more severely does not mean that the one day suspensions
imposed on the 48 grievants was unjustified.
For the foregoing reasons, the Undersigned, duly designated
as the Arbitrator and having duly heard the proofs and allegations
of the above named parties makes the following AWARD:
There was not just cause for the discipline
imposed on Patricia A. Fox. Her one day
suspension is reversed and she shall be made
whole for the time lost.
There was just cause for the discipline imposed on the remaining 48 identified employees for their conduct on June 7 and 8, 1979
which was in violation of Article XIV Section
1 of the Agreement.

DATED: September 12, 1980
STATE OF New York .)oCQo •.,
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

On this twelfth day of September, 1980, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Union of Electrical,
Radio and Machine Workers, Local 731

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #30 30 0021 80

and
General Electric Company
Memphis, Tennessee
The stipulated issue is:
Was the removal of Luke White from the
H-152 Mount Maintenance R-21 "A" classification on October 12, 1979 for inability appropriate under the circumstances? If not, what shall the remedy
be?
A hearing" was held in Memphis, Tennessee on July 10, 1980
at which time Mr. White, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant"
and representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The

A stenographic record was taken

and the parties filed post-hearing briefs.
The Union does not contest the Company's right to remove an
employee from a job because of "inability."

Rather, in the instant

case it contends that the grievant was able to perform his job
duties; that his automatic progression to the top of the rate
range of his job classification is irrebuttable evidence of satisfactory performance; that problems or difficulties with his work
performance, if any, were due to machine defects and/or lack of
adequate training; and that this removal was discriminatory in
that he was not placed in another job or afforded the opportunity
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to bump into another job in accordance with his seniority under
a local layoff agreement or practice as applied to other employees
removed under similar circumstances.
The evidence adduced by the Company abundantly established
that the grievant's productivity and material efficiency on the
H-152 Mechanic's job was significantly below the group average
for an extended period of time, and his mount loss was signifi^
cantly higher.

Indeed, this statistical evidence and unfavorable

comparison with other employees in the group are not seriously
disputed or refuted by the Union.
I am not persuaded that these deficiencies were due to
machine defects or a lack of training.

The former is a bare

allegation, not supported by adequate probative evidence and
there is no

showing that any other employee of the group or

others on those machines on the grievant's shift or other shifts
were similarly affected.

The grievant received the same "buddy"

training as other employees in the same classification; the contract does not require a formal training program; and indedd,
when both the grievant and his supervisor recognized his operational difficulties, he was assisted by and received additional
job training for some 10-12 weeks from a mechanic of acknowledged
skill and excellence.
Despite that latter help, the grievant's work performance
remained chronically inadequate, leading to his removal.

On that

basis I do not find the Company's determination that the grievant
was unable to perform his job duties, to be arbitrary or unreasonable.
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I do not accept the Union's argument that the grievant's
automatic progression to the top of the rate range is conclusive
evidence of satisfactory performance.

To accept that argument

would mean that upon reaching the top of the range, an employee
could never be removed, or even progressively disciplined for
unsatisfactory work performance.

To reach the top of the wage

range would constructively license inadequate work performance,
whether willful or otherwise.

I find no such contract restriction

on the Company nor is the Company estopped from removing an
employee from his job for "inability" after he has reached the
top of the rate range

anymore than it is restricted from removing

him for the same reason in the course of his

progression upward.

In short, I do not interpret Article VI to authorize removal only
at stages in the progression before reaching the top, or to grant
immunity from removal or discipline after the top of the rate
range has been reached.
is

Indeed, the obvious

rhetorical question

what is to be done with an employee who becomes unable or

for the first time shows his inability after reaching the top?
I do not find that the grievant had a contract right to be
placed in another job after his removal, nor do I find that he
was entitled to bump.

The contract contains no explicit provision

on the removal rights of the Company (but as stated, that general
right is conceded by the Union).

Perforce the contract contains

no express provision regarding what is to be done with an employee
removed for "inability."

Hence there is no discernible contract

right to be placed in another job or to be allowed to exercise
bumping .rights.

-4Moreover, the "local agreement" regarding bumping is not
applicable here.

First, if binding on the parties, it covers

layoffs due to lack of work.
layoff for that reason.

The instant situation is not a

Rather it was a removal from available

and existing work because of inability.

So it was not a diminu-

tion in the work force because of declining work.

Second, there

is some serious question as to whether the "local agreement" was
mutually accepted by the parties.

It has not been jointly executed,

and the Company denies its effectiveness and enforceability.
The evidence on "practice" is inconclusive.

In some cases,

employees removed because of inability were placed in other jobs.
But the Company explains that those jobs were "open" and that in
this case there was no "open" job available for the grievant.
The Union has not shown otherwise.

In other cases, primarily

removals for medical reasons, the employees involved were not
placed in other positions.

There is no persuasive evidence of

any prior practice of according bumping rights to employees removed for inability.

In short, I find no practice supportive of

the Union's claim that the grievant's removal was discriminatory
or "disparate" because he was not placed in another job or given
bumping rights.
For the foregoing reasons the grievance is denied.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
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The removal of Luke White from the H-152
Mount Maintenance R-21 "A" classification
on October 12, 1979 for inability, was
appropriate under the circumstances.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: November 11, 1980
STATE OF New York ) .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this eleventh day of November, 1980 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

FEDERAL MEDIATION AND CONCILIATION SERVICE, ADMINISTRATOR

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
American Federation of Government
Employees Local 1760, AFL-CIO

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #79K/27196

and

Department of Health, Education
and Welfare; Office of Program
Centers of the Social Security
Administration

The stipulated issue is:
Was the suspension of Vera Grayson for
ten working days for just and sufficient
cause and to promote the efficiency of
the Service? If not what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held on July 22, 1980 at which time Ms.
Grayson, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant", and representatives of the above named Union and Employer appeared.

All

concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

The

The Union filed a post-hearing

brief; the Employer made an oral summation at the conclusion of
the hearing.
In a prior decision I held the grievance to be arbitrable,.
On the merits I find this to be a classic example of the
proper application of "progressive discipline."
The Employer claims that the grievant was absent without
leave for the period of June 6th through July 27th, 1979, and
more specifically so far as the ten day disciplinary suspension
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and the instant arbitration are concerned, that contrary to
instructions and a work rule the grievant failed to call in each
day she was absent before 10 AM to notify her department that
she would be absent, the reasons therefor, and to seek a leave.
The grievant claims she was not informed of any such rule
or requirement; that at times she did call in or had a member
of her family do so for her; or that she was so ill with "swollen
glands" that she was unable to speak on the telephone.
these contentions.

I reject

The record clearly shows that prior to her

suspension she was repeatedly told orally, and then in writing,
of the requirement that she call in before 10 AM on each day
that she is absent.

There is no doubt that she was told a suffi-

cient number of times and in sufficient form of that requirement.
I am also satisfied that the Employer's record keeping methods
would have recorded calls which she made or which were made 011
her behalf.

Supervision was under instructions to carefully note

when she called and what was stated. A record of calls she made
at other times and at later hours persuades me that the record
keeping of the grievant's telephone calls to her department is
complete and accurate, and I therefore must conclude that calls
she says she made or which she says were made on her behalf but
which are nowhere recorded, cannot be credited to her.

In the

absence of explicit supporting medical testimony, I cannot accept
her testimony that her "swollen gland condition" made speaking on
the telephone impossible.
I do not find the Employer's rule to be unreasonable.
fore it is enforceable.

The Employer has shown the work

There
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disruptions that result from unexpected absence.

In the case of

employees like the grievant, who have had extended periods of
absences due to illness, I do not find it illogical or unreasonable for the Employer to require a daily callin before 10 AM so
that the work for that day may be planned and carried out in the
employee's absence.
In short, the Employer's rule is reasonable; the grievant
absented herself for an extended period without complying with
the rule; she had been previously warned both verbally and in
writing to comply with the rule; and her failure to do so thereafter warranted the imposition of the next step in the traditional progressive discipline process, namely that of a suspension.
Though a lesser period of suspension may have been adequate in
carrying out the purpose of progressive discipline, I do not find
a ten working day suspension to be excessive.
The Union's contention that the Employer failed to comply
with the 15 workday time limit of Article 27 Section c of the
contract is also rejected.

The pertinent part of that contract

provision reads:
If the Program Service Center feels that
disciplinary or adverse action is necessary, such action shall be initiated
promptly, normally within 15 workdays after
the offense has been committed or has been
made known to the Program Service Center.
The grievant's period of absence ended July 27, 1979.
formally suspended by notice dated August 27.

She was

However the fore-

going time limit is the period in which the disciplinary action is
to be initiated. The specific pertinent contract language is:

-4... such action shall be initiated promptly,
normally within fifteen workdays ... (emphasis added)
The Employer has met that time limit.

Though not completed and

formally imposed until August 27 the disciplinary action was
initiated by no later than July 31, 1979 (four calendar days after
the period of absence) by a letter of that date to the grievant
from the Chief, Data Preparation Section informing her of the two
charges against her and of the sixteen specifications within Charge
I and the twelve specifications within Charge II.

It further in-

formed her that "it is proposed to suspend you from duty and pay
for a period of ten work days ..." I consider that letter with its
explicit particularization of the charges and specifications and
the proposed penalty, as constituting the initiation of the disciplinary action within the meaning of the foregoing contract language
For the foregoing reasons the disciplinary suspension is upheld0
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
The suspension of Vera Grayson for ten working days was for just and sufficient cause
and was to promote the efficiency of the
Service.

DATED: August 20, 1980
STATE OF New York )sg .
COUNTY OF New York ) "

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

On this twentieth day of August, 1980 before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same0

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR

Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
Local 348 Bakery, Confectionary and
Tobacco Workers' International Union

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1130 1086 80

and
ITT Continential Baking Company, Inc,

The stipulated issue is:
Was there just cause for the discharge of
Richard Catarius? If not what shall be the
remedy?
A hearing was held at the Boston, Massachusetts office of
the American Arbitration Association on December 8, 1980 at
which time Mr. Catarius, hereinafter referred to as the "grievant",
and representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared.
All concerned were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence
and argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
I accept as credible and accurate the testimony of Supervisor Shanks regarding when and how often the grievant was in
the "break room."

On that basis the grievant was not properly

in that room from at least 11 AM to 11:20 AM on May 12th; and
therefore overstayed his authorized break time by that amount of
time during that unauthorized period.
Standing alone of course, that offense is not grounds for
the ultimate penalty of discharge. However the grievant had been
previously warned about over extending break periods; had been
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previously reprimanded for placing his jacket in a location
violative of company rules; and had received a 1\s suspension
(as affirmed by an Arbitration Award) for using foul language
to a manager.

The Company's letter to the grievant which accom-

panied notice of the suspension warned him that his involvement
in other incidents of misconduct or violations of Company policy
would result in his termination.
There are two instant questions.

One is whether the May

12th extension of breaktime should trigger the grievant's discharge.

The other, which must be dealt with first, is whether

the last offense and any consequences therefrom were settled by
a verbal warning which on May 12th Supervisor Shanks imposed on
the grievant in the presence of the Union's Steward, and which,
according to the Union, was accepted by both the grievant and
the Union as the full extent of any disciplinary penalty.
I do not accept the Union's assertion that the penalty
which the Company may impose for the grievant's overall record
is limited to that verbal warning.

I conclude that Shanks

penalized the grievant only for the May 12th incident, and intended that the penalty be applicable only to that incident.

He

did not consider (though he had the authority to do so) the
grievant's full disciplinary record, nor am I persuaded did he
intend to discipline the grievant for that total record.

Under

that circumstance, I do not find that higher officials of the
Company were barred from increasing the penalty as they promptly
did,,after learning of the events of May 12th.

Indeed in my

experience it is not uncommon for a final incident ultimately

-3triggering a severe penalty to be first dealt with as a warning
and thereafter further perfected when the affected employee's
entire record is reviewed.

The discussions between Shanks, fche

Steward and the grievant, were short, inconclusive and ambiguous.
A statement following the imposition of the verbal warning that
"that's it" can mean that that was the penalty for over-extending
or taking an unauthorized break, but not the full or final disposition of the grievant's overall disciplinary record, just as
much as contended by the Union, that it was dispositive of any
and all action the Company might maintain against the grievant.
Hence, though I think Supervisor Shanks should have delayed
imposing a penalty until he had conferred with personnel, or
should have expressly conditioned the verbal warning on the
possibility of further and more severe discipline, I am not
preapred to hold that the verbal warning on May 12th, estopped
the Company from increasing the penalty two days later.
The foregoing not withstanding, I conclude that the penalty
of discharge was too severe.

Though the grievant was warned

when he was suspended for 2% days in November, 1979 that further
offenses would result in his discharge, the arbitrator in reviewing and upholding that suspension did not find the grievant
guilty of all the charges, and did not incorporate the final
warning in his decision.

Additionally, the grievant was employed

by the Company for sixteen years.

With the exception of the

"foul-language" offense which led to the 2% days suspension, his
other relevant disciplinary penalties were for offenses that
cannot be deemed very serious.

Under those circumstances I

-4consider it proper and appropriate that he suffer an extended
suspension to impress upon him the unsatisfactory nature of his
conduct and cumulative record and to give him one final chance
to achieve and maintain a satisfactory work record.

I am not

persuaded that the short 2% days suspension served that warning
and rehabilitative purpose within the meaning of the traditional
"progressive discipline" process.

Therefore, as a final chance,

I shall reduce the grievant's penalty of discharge to a disciplinary suspension.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
The discharge of Richard Catarius is reduced
to a suspension. He shall be reinstated without back pay and the period of time between his
discharge and reinstatement shall be deemed a
disciplinary suspension for his overall relevant
record. He is warned that this is his last
chance and that further misconduct or violations
of Company rules or policies would, in the
opinion of this Arbitrator, be the grounds for
his discharge.

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator
DATED: December 11, 1980
STATE OF New York )gg .
COUNTY OF New York )
On this llth day of December, 1980, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

AMERICAN ARBITRATION ASSOCIATION, ADMINISTRATOR
Voluntary Labor Arbitration Tribunal
In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
Bakery Drivers Union No. 550

OPINION AND AWARD
Case #1330 0862 78

and
I.T.T. Continental Baking Co., Inc.

In accordance with Article VII of the collective bargaining
agreement dated July 20, 1976 between the above named Union and
Company, the Undersigned was designated as the Arbitrator to hear
and decide the following stipulated issue:
Is the Company's action in having a Waldbaums
supermarket at Co-Op City, the Bronx, served
by Route 533 prior to March 1978, and thereafter served by Route 512, improper? If so,
what shall be the remedy?
Hearings were held at the New York City office of the
American Arbitration Association on January 8, May 23, May 31,
October 8, and October 11, 1979 at which time representatives
of the Union and Company appeared and were afforded full
opportunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and
cross-examine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was taken.

A

stenographic record of the hearing was taken.
BACKGROUND
The Company is engaged in the sale and delivery of bread
and cake products through a route delivery system.

The instant

case concerns the bread portion of the Company's operation which
is operated as a distinct entity.

The bread division encompasses

-2the geographical area of Long Island (Suffolk, Nassau, Queens
and Brooklyn), Manhattan, the Bronx and Westchester Counties
and is serviced from nine (9) depots that are divided into
approximately 257 routes that contain between 10,000 and 15,000
stops.

The Union represents the sales-drivers who pick up the

products at the depots, transport the products in step vans to
the various stops on a particular route, deliver the products
to the stops, and set up the products on shelves or displays
for sale to the public.

Each driver is assigned to a partic-

ular route and receives a base salary that was $150 per week
at the time of the grievance as well as a commission of 8%% of
the sales.

Routes are assigned to a particular driver on the

basis of a bidding system in which a route opening is posted
for 72 hours and the senior employee who bids receives the route,
At the time of bidding, the Company posts the route number, the
location, the number of stops, the departure time, and the amount
of business on the route.
For many years the Company belonged to the New York City
Bakery Employers Labor Council that represented the Company,
the American Bakeries Company, and Drake Bakeries, Division of
Borden Foods for the purpose, inter alia, of negotiating a
collective bargaining agreement with the Union.
disbanded on October 7, 1978.

The Council

The parties stipulated that the

bargaining unit employees are covered by 1) a basic collective
bargaining agreement entered into by the now defunct Employer
Council and the Union dated July 20, 1976 and received in

-3evidence as Joint Exhibit l(a); and 2) a Memorandum of Agreement
entered into by the Company and the Union dated November 2, 1978
and received in evidence as Joint Exhibit l(b).
The present grievance arose out of the Elmsford Depot which
is the point of origin for 23 routes.

Prior to March 1978 Route

533 serviced a stop in Co-Op City, the Bronx, which had been a
Key Food Supermarket and subsequently became a Waldbaums Supermarket, hereinafter referred to as the Key Food-Waldbaums.

Route

533 had been the highest volume route in the geographical area
serviced by the Elmsford Depot.

The route went up for bidding

in March 1978 due to the retirement of the incumbent driver.
However, prior to the bidding the Company deleted the Key FoodWaldbaums stop from Route 533.

The grievance complains of the

assignment of that stop to Route 512 rather than to Route 529,
(which is geographically contiguous).

The right of the Company

to sever the Key Food-Waldbaums stop from Route 533 is not
disputed.
PERTINENT CONTRACT CLAUSES
The following clauses in the collective bargaining agreement
are applicable to this case:
Article XXIV-Miscellaneous
(c) No route shall be eliminated by the Employer
without 30 days prior written notice to the Union
of its intention to do so.
Schedule "A" Section 2-Wage Rates
(a) 7. (B)... Each salesman shall receive full
commission on all goods delivered on his route...
(D) A salesman whose route is split shall be
guaranteed the full amount of the difference

-4in commission caused by the cut for a period
of eleven (11) weeks thereafter; and for the
succeeding period of the next nine (9) weeks,
the amount of this special compensation paid
to him shall be reduced ten percent (10%) each
week.
CONTENTIONS OF THE UNION
The Union contends that the present grievance involves the
integrity of the route system.

Thus the Union argues that each

driver services all stores on the route and this aspect of the
employment relationship is synonymous with servicing all stores
within an area or boundary that is coterminous with the route.
The Union admits that not every single contingency is provided
for in the collective bargaining agreement in effect between the
parties; however, the Union maintains that relations, dealings,
understandings, and practices develop over a period of years and
rise to the level of practices that have become part of the
contract.

The Union asserts that when the Company intends to

split off or dissect a portion of a route that is assigned to a
particular driver, the integrity of the route system requires
that resultant route boundaries may not be breached.

To do this,

in the Union's view, the Company has two options: 1) the territory
can be reassigned to the next adjoining route; or 2) the territory
can be reassigned to a newly established route.

If the first

alternative is selected, the route that is immediately adjacent
to the original route must receive the severed portion of the
original route.

In that manner the resulting route boundaries

will be secure and will not be breached by an intrusion from a

-5third route.
The Union's position is rooted to the system of compensation
that has developed in the industry.

Since a significant part of

each driver's income is derived from commissions, a crucial fact
is that the Company is obligated to pay each salesman full
commission on all goods delivered on his route in accordance with
Schedule "A" Section 2-(A) 7. (B) of the collective bargaining
agreement.

The Union, therefore, claims that not only is each

stop that a driver services part of his route but the territory
itself that conforms to the route is also part of the route.

In

support of this contention, the Union points to the practice of
assigning the driver whose route encompasses a Thrift Store the
commissions for the sale of fresh bread in that store.

Similarly,

the Union stresses that if a customer goes directly to a depot
in order to purchase bread, the driver encompassing the location
of the customer will receive the commission.

In the Union's view,

this practice conforms to the tramp route policy whereby seasonal
deliveries to camps or restaurants or picnics result in commissions
being paid to the driver whose permanent route encompasses the
tramp route delivery.
In light of these various practices, the Union argues that
the Company's action that give rise to this grievance will destroy
the integrity of the route system.

The Union argues that the

Company's action requires the driver of Route 512 to cut through
the territory of Route 529 in order to service the Key FoodWaldbaums.

This action violates a basic premise of the Union's

-6conception of the route system, namely, that no driver is to cut
through or into another driver's territory to service a stop, or
put another way, no stop is to be assigned when to service it
requires that or those encroachments.

The Union asserts that

such intermingling of routes will play havoc with the compensation system that is used in the industry and threaten the job
security of the drivers.

As an example, the Union states that

for punitive or discriminatory reasons the Company could assign
a stop to a driver that is twenty (20) miles away from the heart
of that driver's route
financial difficulties.

thereby causing him operational and
Also, the Company could transfer a

lucrative stop from within a particular driver's territory thereby depriving him of a normal source of income.

In contrast,

secure, clear, and undisputed boundaries enable a drive to build
up an area, obtain new accounts, and increase the volume of sale
within the route so that the Company will receive larger receipts
and the driver will receive more commissions.

Furthermore, un-

clear boundaries will result in many disputes among the drivers
concerning who is entitled to service newly acquired stops.
The Union presented a number of witnesses in support of its
position.
'

The first witness, Jack Scherer, served as President

of the Union until he retired.

Scherer testified that management:

consulted with the Union prior to splitting routes and that the
parties worked out mutually acceptable arrangements.

As an

example, Scherer mentioned a route elimination in the Bay Ridge-

-7Fort Hamilton section of Brooklyn that involved a redistribution
that affected 5 or 6 different routes.

However, he stated,

though many routes are affected causing a "chain reaction" the
boundary concept for routes is preserved.

He explained that to

accomplish this preservation of boundaries, all reassignments are
limited to perimeter stops rather than interior or center stops
within a route and that reassignment of perimeter stops were to
other routes contiguous thereto.

Scherer also indicated that the

Company recognized this approach and in fact possessed maps in
the various depots that visually identified the stops on a route.
He also mentioned that there were not any geographic areas within the Company's jurisdiction that were not assigned to a particular route.

The witness testified that from time to time the

parties agreed to make adjustments so that the earnings of the
drivers would be equitable.
The current President of the Union, Richard Volpe, then
testified.

He stressed the fact that the New England Thruway

forms a natural boundary near the Co-Op City area and that this
limited the access to the Key Food-Waldbaums and had to be
considered in drawing the route boundaries.

Volpe stated that

the Company could have realigned the routes by shifting the
perimeter stops but not by assigning the Key Food-Waldbaums to
Route 512 since Route 529 was closer from a geographical standpoint.

The witness recalled that the integration of fourteen

(14) former Silvercup employees into the Company's operation at

-8first involved paying the permanent employees commissions for
all sales within their route.

Lastly, Volpe raised the possibil-

ity that in the future interior stops could be plucked by the
Company for time purposes if the present grievance is denied.
Eric Nitschke, a shop steward from Suffolk County, testified
next.

His testimony included references to Union Exhibit 3 which

was a map of Nassau and Suffolk Counties that contained a descrip
tion of the various routes in that area as prepared by the Union
on the basis of information provided by the affected employees.
Nitschke related that the men understood that the boundaries are
to be respected and when the Company starts interfering with them
in terms of readjustments then this will interfere with the
rights that the employees have and will lead to chaos.

The

witness cited the one exception to the sacredness of the route
boundaries as being the dislocated stop or persona non grata
situation in which there is a

personality conflict or some other

problem between a particular driver and a store manager.

In

this situation the Union and the Company permit another driver to
enter the original driver's territory in order to service the
stop.
Walter Busching, a shop steward in Jamaica, then testified.
He acknowledged that splits are frequent but that dislocations do
not occur and that there had not been a situation similar to the
Key Food-Waldbaums reassignment in the 27 years that he had
worked for the Company.

He mentioned that in addition to the

-9persona non grata situation, one driver might cross the boundary
of another driver if there was a fire or if a supermarket stop
was lost and as a result a driver was experiencing a financial
hardship.

In such a case if an adjacent route had an overload,

the Union and the Company would arrange to help out the driver.
With respect to the persona non grata exception, the driver who
made the actual delivery received the commission.
The Union then called Alfonso Santos, Jr., who had filed
the grievance over the assignment of the Key Food-Waldbaums to
Route 512 rather than Route 529 which he had worked at the time.
After presenting some written exhibits, Santos described the
events surrounding the split.

Santos related that his super-

visor, Jerry Kaiser, at first had indicated that Santos would get
the stop.

Thereafter, Santos learned that Route 512 had received

the stop.

Santos subsequently found out that the Company believed

he could not service the stop at the proper time.

Santos, how-

ever, indicated he could properly service the Key Food-Waldbaums \n addi

the four stops before the driver of Route 512 even reaches the
Key Food-Waldbaums.
With respect to the time schedule of deliveries for the
key stops, Santos testified on cross-examination that he adhered
to the following schedule:
stop number
1
"
2
3
4

place
arrive
Imperial
5:30 or 5:40
(three small stops)
Daitch #10
7:00 or 7:30*
Hills (now Daitch)7:30 or 8:00
Grand Union
8:30 or 9:00

depart
6:00 or 6:10
7:30 or 8:00
8:00 or 8:30
8:45 or 9:15**

-10*depending upon whether manager or assistant manager present
**service required by 10:00
Santos indicated that he services two additional Daitch stores
but that they were not large accounts on his route and the time
requirement was very flexible.

The witness reiterated that the

Company did not provide him with an opportunity to demonstrate
that he could in fact properly service the stop by granting him
a trial period.

He further testified that after Route 512

received the Key Food-Waldbaums stop he did receive five (5) of
the stops previously assigned to Route 512 which he covered at
the end of his delivery day.
The Union then called Anthony Catenaro, a business agent
from Local 194 in New Jersey.

The witness testified that his

Local negotiates jointly with Local 550.

Catenaro stated that

there has been no comparable situation in New Jersey.

He

discussed the tramp routes in New Jersey and concluded with the
fact that the geographical boundary is the key.
The Union called Jerome Gibbs as its final witness.

Gibbs

had belonged to the Union for 40 years and served as a Union
officer for 20 years as well as a member of the Executive Board
for 35 years.
case.

He stated that he had never encountered a similar

He acknowledged the fact that the Key Food-Waldbaums was

a key stop and that all the supermarkets prefer early service.
He stressed that the Company and the Union had always sat down
in the past, discussed the situation, and if a realignment had
to be made the closest route received the stop and the contractual
compensation was paid to the original route.

Gibbs also confirmed

-lithe persona non grata situation and testified that the parties
always worked things out on the occasions when such a situation
arose.

At no time would the Union have accepted one driver cross-

ing over the route of another driver according to Gibbs.
CONTENTIONS OF THE COMPANY
The Company claims that it has always considered three
factors when it assigns stops to routes: 1) the geographical
location of the stop; 2) the time and service requirements of
the stop; and 3) the volume of sales of the driver.

Since there

are between 10,000 and 15,000 different stops, it is impossible
for the Company to discuss each assignment with the Union.
Accordingly, the Company asserts that it has a long history of
unilaterally determining and assigning stops.

In particular,

the Company emphasizes its expertise in running this aspect of
the business enterprise while at the same time highlighting the
fact that the Union is not in the boundary-drawing business.

In

reaching the final decision of where to assign a particular stop
the Company initially is guided by the location of the stop.
The Company then analyzes any special service requirements that
may exist.

Of special importance to the Company is the high

priority that it attaches to high volume accounts which are
chiefly the supermarkets and supermarket chains.

In this regard

the Company strives to furnish early deliveries to the key accounts
in order to maintain a strong relationship with each key account
and also to maximize the market exposure of the Company's
product.

In contrast, the Company is less insistent upon assign-

-12ing the smaller stops and therefore will normally follow the
wishes of the drivers.

Finally, the Company is mindful of the

distribution of sales to the various routes and thus in certain
circumstances will consider whether a route is particularly high
or low in terms of its total sales.
The Company's case is also based upon its reasoning that
since the parties agree that the Company possesses the right to
split a route, the concomitant right to assign stops must also
be possessed by the Company.

The Company views the evidence

presented by the Union as failing to satisfy the Union's

burden

to establish a specific practice concerning the integrity of the
boundaries, which the Company does not concede exist.

The

Company argues that its preeminent interest in controlling and
directing how routes are structured could be defeated only if
the Union established discrimination by the Company in making an
assignment.

In the absence of such a situation, the Company

relies upon its right to run the business as the authority for
its position since there is no contractual provision that
qualifies this inherent managerial right.
The Company presented several witnesses in support of its
position.

Charles Moscati, one of the two Sales Managers for

bread in the Metropolitan area, stated that of utmost importance
to the Company is the goal of maximizing the volume at each stop.
Moscati denied that the Union officials are involved in assignment decisions but did acknowledge that representatives of the
Company listen to complaints and suggestions from the drivers

-13and brief the aiop steward about changes that would be happening.
Notwithstanding this degree of involvement, Moscati underscored
the fact that the actual decision is made exclusively by the
Company.

During two appearances before the Arbitrator, the

witness discussed a number of stops that were assigned for
reasons other than location:
stop
Hartsdale Pathmark
Westchester Avenue
Royal Farms
Durso Key Food
E & B Supermarket
Third Avenue
E.L. Grant Highway
(two stops)
Broadway, Manhattan
Waldbaums & First
National Store
125th Street,
Manhattan
Harlem Coop
Bruckner Boulevard
Pathmark

nearest rte
14
47 (57)

assigned rte
26
46

reason
service
service

51

61

service

51
41

53
21

service
persona
non grata

58

55

unknown

33(34)
13

?
11

unknown
service

62

69

unknown

During the course of this testimony, Moscati stressed that
certain stops require service during a specified time period
which in some cases may involve service before the store opens
to the public.

In addition, the Company tries to service the

key stops before the public is allowed to enter so that maximum
sales may be obtained.

The witness conceded, however, that he

did not know of any stop located right in the middle of another
route except in the persona non grata situation.
The Company then called as a witness Jack Nemchin, the Ozone
Park Branch Manager.

Nemchin indicated that stops are reassigned

to create routes, build routes, eliminate routes, and to promote

-14business.
and volume.

The standards for assignments involve geography, time,
The witness then mentioned a number of stops that

were assigned for reasons other than location:
stop
Sloan's FDR Drive
Grandview Dairy

nearest rte
422
162?

assigned rte
" 425
4

Waldbaums
Waldbaums Starrett
City

162

20

reason
service
persona non
grata
service

99

88

volume

With respect to this testimony, the witness indicated that many
stops that originate from the Ozone Park Depot are placed on
routes that result in drivers crisscrossing each other on a
somewhat regular basis.

The witness discussed this contention

in conjunction with Company Exhibits 3a, 3b, 3c, 3d, and 3e which!
the Company argues provide visual evidence of the intermingling
of routes.
Jerry Kaiser, the Lead Sales Supervisor at the Elmsford
Depot, testified next.

After receiving Company Exhibits 4(a)

and 4(b), Kaiser discussed the Key Food-Waldbaums stop at Co-Op
City.

He indicated that Route 533, the route that had previously

serviced the stop, was the highest volume route in the depot
prior to the split and had some key stops that were not being
serviced until the late morning; whereas, Route 512 only had two
key stops.

The earlier stop on Route 512 could not be serviced

until approximately 8:00 a.m. thereby enabling Route 512 to
service the Key Food-Waldbaums at 7:30 a.m.

In contrast, Kaiser

pointed out that Route 529 had six key stops that Santos covered
in the following manner:
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stop number
1
2
3
4
5
6

place
Imperial
Daitch #10
Hills
Grand Union
Daitch
Daitch #2

arrive
6:30
7:30
8:30
9:30
10:00
11:00

depart
blank
8:15
9:15
10:00
10:20
11:30

Based upon this schedule, Kaiser concluded that adding the Key
Food-Waldbaums stop to Route 529 would not be consistent with
the Company's interests.

Kaiser admitted that Santos sometimes

gained access to the Imperial stop earlier than 6:30 a.m.,
however, Kaiser could not rely upon that kind of situation to
set up a route structure.

Kaiser also testified that Route 529

and Route 512 transacted weekly sales within $50 of each other.
The witness elaborated on the time problem by explaining that
Route 529 would not service the last key account-stop 6, Daitch
#2--until the early afternoon if the Key Food-Waldbaums stop
were added to the route.

He further stated that it takes

approximately one (1) hour to service the Co-Op City stop.
Kaiser also testified that he knew that Route 512 would cross
over Route 529 on the way to servicing Co-Op City.
Opinion
Initially, it is well settled that an employer is entitled
to flexibility in designing its business operation.

Whether

this discretion is characterized as the entrepreneurial control
of the business, business considerations or managerial prerogatives, it constitutes the basic authority of the employer limited
only by the express provisions of the collective bargaining
agreement or by an established practice, or other arrangement.

-16In the instant case there is no express contract restriction
on the Company's right to determine stop assignments.

The

question therefore narrows to whether a practice or any other
determinative arrangement obtains, that makes the Company's
unilateral action improper.
The Union presented several witnesses who served in the
Union for many years.

Messrs. Scherer and Gibbs indicated that

the Company and the Union had frequently discussed assignments.
I cannot conclude

by following a sensible and mature policy

of consulting with the Union or by considering the views,
suggestions, or complaints of the Union and the drivers that the 1
Company had compromised or waived its ultimate right to make the
final decision.
A significant portion of the testimony focused upon previous
instances in which route assignments involved considerations
other than geography.

The dislocated stops (persona non grata

stops) establish that the parties permitted a driver who a store
manager would not allow to service the store to be replaced by
another driver who would not otherwise service that area..

The

provision for the commissions to be paid to the permanent drivers
during the phasing in of the former Silvercup drivers illustratec
the balance that was achieved between the commission system and
the business goals of the Company.

The information provided by

Charles Moscati established that the Company assigned certain
stops for reasons other than geography.
factor became

The service requirement

the primary consideration in making those assign-

-17ments.

Although the witness conceded on cross-examination that

some of the stops could be considered as perimeter stops, this
fact does not in and of itself vitiate the existence of and
reliance on the time and service variable as a consideration in
determining

assignments.

The testimony provided by Jack Nemchin confirmed the Company
practice of retaining the discretion to place stops within routes
based upon time and service requirements.

Although some of the

specific stops mentioned could be viewed as solely perimeter
stops, the significant testimony concerned the Ozone Park Depot
stops which involved an intermingling

of routes.

I am

satisfied that the information contained in Company Exhibits 3a,
3b, 3c, 3d, and 3e establishes a practice of assigning stops for
reasons other than goegraphy. It, together with other persuasive
evidence rebuts the Union's claim that route boundaries are
inviolatively maintained and respected as an unvaried practice.
Nevertheless, the Union has a legitimate economic concern
with respect to stop assignments.

Schedule "A" Section 2(A) 7.

(B) states in pertinent part that: "Each salesman shall receive
full commission on all goods delivered on his route."

To my mind

this means that a driver's compensation and the stops to which
he is assigned are interdependent, and that as the location from
which a driver's commission is deriveda route is more than a
series of stops, but of necessity has territorial aspects.

But

this does not mean that a route has firm, permanent and immutable
boundaries.

-18The trouble with the Union's case in this proceeding is that
it argues for the maintenance of defined route boundaries, yet
admits that the Company has a managerial right to change stop
assignments and to alter the scope of a driver's territory.

It

recognizes that there is no applicable contract restriction, but
contends that because the vast percentage of stop assignments
have been determined by geography,
a practice of geographic pre..
eminence has been cast.

Yet, the latter assertion cuts both ways.

That the Company has only infrequently assigned stops

for

reasons other than geography can mean that in most situations
two factors which the Company says it considers in making
assignments, coincided with the geography„

And that only at

times, perhaps infrequently, as in the instant case, when other
factors, such as time, service, etc. are more compelling and
run counter to geography, does it exercise its managerial right
differently.

In short, that most assignments appear to have been

based on geography

does not mean as the Union appears to argue,

that geography is the principal^ preeminent or exclusive determining factor.

On

that basis, and I so find, the quantity of

assignments apparently consistent with the Union's geographic
theory

does not constitute a practice barring the Company from

using other legitimate factors to make a different decision.

What remains therefore is whether, in the instant case, the \y considere

they were properly applicable to the decision to assign the
Co-Op City stop to Route

512.

-19Santos testified that he believed he could have serviced
the disputed stop properly whereas Kaiser concluded that timely
service could not be effectuated by Santos.

Although Santos was

of the view that he only had four (4) key stops, I accept the
Company's assertion that two (2) Daitch stops are properly
classified as key stops because the stores are part of a large
supermarket chain with which the Company transacts a large volume
of business.

An appraisal of Route 259's ability to absorb the

additional assignment of the Key Food-Waldbaums stop must be
viewed in conjunction with its six (6) original stops.

Although

Santos credibly testified that he is able to gain access to his
first stop, Imperial, at either 5:30 or 5:40 a.m., this early
opening appears to be tied directly to an Imperial store employee
who happens to arrive at that early hour.

I find the Company's

reluctance to base an entire, permanent route alignment on this
one uncertain and potentially impermanent circumstance, to be
reasonable.

Therefore, as I see it, the Company reasonably fore-

casted the time schedule of Santos on Route 529 and had a
legitimate basis for concluding that the six (6) original key
stops coupled with a seventh (7) Key Food-Waldbaums key stop
could not be serviced with the desired efficiency.

I conclude

therefore, that the Company had a reasonable basis for assigning
the Key Food-Waldbaums stop to the next adjacent route (#512).
This finding is reenforced by the fact that to compensate for
that decision, the Company reassigned five (5) small stops from
Route 512 to Route 529 that could be serviced at the end of

-20Route 529 's route.

It did so, I am persuaded to insure the

adequacy of Route 529 and thereby to protect the letter and
spirit of the commission arrangement mandated by the collective
bargaining agreement.
I do not find the cases cited by the parties to be
controlling.

First, the instant case is not a commission case

as some of the cited cases were.

Second, my authority is limited

to the interpretation and application of the current contract
to this Company and not the contract of another company. Finally,
the other cases cited are factually different from what is before
me, and hence are of indeterminative value.
The Union has not sustained its burden to demonstrate that
a practice existed that barred the Company from assigning the
Co-Op City stop to Route 512.

The grievance is, therefore,

denied.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having been duly sworn, and having duly heard the proofs and
allegations of the above named parties, makes the following
AWARD:
The Company's action in having a Waldbaums
supermarket at Co-Op City, The Bronx, served
by Route 533 prior to March 1978, and thereafter served by Route 512, was not improper.

DATED: February 29, 1980
STATE OF New York ) s s > :
COUNTY OF New York )

Eric J. Schmertz
Arbitrator

On this twenty-ninth day of February, 1980 before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known
and known to me to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to
me that he executed the same.

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
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Amalgamated Local Union 355
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The stipulated issue is:
Whether the Employer has violated the
collective bargaining agreement by
discharging Maurizio Lopiccolo without
proper cause. In any event what shall
the remedy be?
/»
>
r 7 #,••• • (tf/ityfa- '•'"•'" ('"'^ V
Hearings were held on July 15 amMt7, 1980 in Jericho,
New York at which time Mr. Lopiccolo, hereinafter referred to
as the "grievant" and representatives of the above named Union
and Employer appeared.

All concerned were afforded full oppor-

tunity to offer evidence and argument and to examine and crossexamine witnesses.

The Arbitrator's Oath was waived.

Cumulatively, the grievant?s disciplinary record, including
the accident with his truck on June 19, 1980, would warrant his
discharge provided he had been progressively disciplined adequately
and effectively.
I find that the grievant'^s accident on June 19, 1980 was
"chargeable"; that he drove at too rapid a speed in a construction
zone and probably was too close to the truck ahead of him to stop
when that vehicle stopped abruptly.

I do not accept his claim

that the brakes on his truck were "long" or delayed in taking hold.
The other violations for which the grievant was warned or discipline
over his approximately two and one-half years of service are not
challengeable in this proceeding, inasmuch as they were not grieved
when originally imposed.
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As the Employer has recognized in citing the grievant's.
entire record as grounds for his dismissal, none of his offenses,
|j
standing alone, is grounds for summary dismissal.

Hence, in order

)!
I:

to uphold the Employer in this case, the grievant's cumulative

i

record must have been subjected to the well established principle
of "progressive discipline", culminating finally in discharge only

!

after the imposition of lesser penalties of warnings and suspen\ sion. In this regard the Employer's case fails. The grievant

!
;

was disciplined for prior accidents, for administrative negligence

I
and for excessive tardiness.

\'

In November of 1979 and in April,

! 1980 his letters of discipline included notices of suspensions of
I
!' three days and one day respectively. It is undisputed and
stipulated however that those two periods of suspensions were
j!

never implemented and the grievant did not serve the time off.
Additionally, the Employer is unable to show that a suspension
i|

scheduled for the grievant in April of 1979 was ever implemented,
and I therefore conclude that like the aforementioned "suspensions"
11

! this latter referred to suspension was not carried out either.
i1

r

I

do not consider another circumstance when the grievant reported
late to work and was not permitted to work that day, to meet the
test of a disciplinary suspension within the meaning of a
"progressive discipline" formula.

;

Hence, though the grievant'.s

disciplinary record includes verbal and written warnings, he was not
suspended, and therefore the step generally viewed as the condition

(••

precedent to discharge was never taken.
The purpose of progressive discipline is well established.
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It is to demonstrate to an offending employee that his violations

III
!|

are serious and will not be tolerated by the employer if continued;

: to give him an opportunity to correct his errors; and to impress
i, •
!' upon him the need to improve his record by not only warning him
ji of his violations but by depriving him of pay by at least one
suspension.

The absence of a suspension, with attendant loss of

[j pay, substantially reduces the desired impact on the employee.

iii|

By failing to carry out the suspensions here the Employer neglected

;'

to take the step especially designed to impart to the grievant,

I

••

the seriousness with which his work violations were viewed.

A

|:

i

il necessary and requisite step in the progressive discipline
!
II sequence was omitted, and with that omission the Employer has

r

;! waived its right to rely upon "suspensions" in support of the
,! penalty of discharge in this case., \ \
ii

Under the toregoing circumstances, the discipline wtiich
should be imposed on the grievant is the suspension which should
have been but was not previously implemented.

Until that is done

ii his disciplinary record is not ripe for dismissal. I shall di
fcv .P
his -jalns tat emeu*- ^ij^b-^it bqrk pQy/, TH-t+i
TH —H-A-^m-p-f^ri rVf Mmg—K O ~

, pejisjjax- £^r his overall record.

The grievant should

recognize

i

li that in the opinion of this Arbitrator, a failure to maintain _a
j satisfactory work record in the future would, together with his
\
prior disciplinary record , constitute just cause for his discharge
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The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
•parties makes the following AWARD:
For failure to adequately and effectively
apply "progressive discipline" the discharge of Maurizio Lopiccolo was without
proper cause. His discharge is reduced to
*a. disciplinary suspension., He shall be re-, -r
instated wifeteesfe=&asi

Eric/j. Schmertz
Arbitrator
| DATED: July 21, 1980
ij STATE OF New York )SS.:
COUNTY OF New York )
On this twenty first day of July, 1980, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me to
be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

In the Matter of the Arbitration
between
International Ladies' Garment
Workers' Union
OPINION AND AWARD
and
Jonathan Logan, Inc.
Butte Knitting Mills
Transportation Division

The stipulated issue is:
Did the Employer violate Article 14 of
Transportation Supplemental Agreement
by refusing to pay to Gary Dycus and
Arnold Hughes for eight hours on March
3, 1979 and James Brown and Fate Calvert
for seven and one-half hours on February
7, 1979?
Hearings were held in Spartanburg, South Carolina and New
York City on May 13 and June 16, 1980 respectively, at which
time representatives of the above named Union and Company appeared
and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and argument
and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.
Oath was waived.

The Arbitrator's

The parties filed post-hearing briefs.

Article 14 of the Transportation Supplemental Agreement
reads:
14. Breakdown - Overloads
Drivers shall be paid at their hourly
rates for the first eight (8) hours and
any additional time required to stay with
the unit for time lost due to breakdown,
impassable highways, overloads, certificate
violations, or other delays beyond the control of the driver.
Also pertinent is Article 16 of that Agreement which reads:
16.

Layover.

(a) If relieved of duty, both drivers
shall be paid at the hourly rate after the
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fifteenth (15th) hour of layover or evident
delay. It is intended thereby to insure at
least eight (8) hours of pay in any twentyfour (24) hour period for a driver who is on
the road or away from home.
(b) The Employer shall provide adequate
motel or hotel sleeping quarters to a driver who is relieved of duty for more than
eight (8) hours. This provision shall not
be applied arbitrarily or consistently used
to the discomfort or deliberate delay of
drivers or inconsistently with the above provisions. Any such arbitrary or inconsistent
application or use shall be a proper subject
for the grievance procedure.
Grievance of Dycus and Hughes
The grievants are truck drivers.

On route driving south to

Spartanburg in the regular performance of their duties, they ran
into snow and ice which they judged made the highway impassable.
They stopped at a truck stop in Bracey, Virginia at about 1:30 AM
on -March 3, 1978 and stayed there until about 9:30 AM when they
resumed their trip to Spartanburg.

The Company denied them pay

for that eight hour period because they failed to call-in to the
Spartanburg office or to a responsible Company official, in violation of a rule requiring drivers stuck on the road for more than
a couple of hours to call-in to the Company's office, whether it
be day or night.
It is conceded that the initial decision to stop or to continue driving in circumstances
with the drivers.

of severe inclement weather, rests

In the instant case, though the Company

suggests

that the highway may not have been "impassable" inasmuch as the
grievants were driving south and other driving teams heading north
were able to continue moving over the same stretch of road, there

-3-

is no probative evidence to dispute both the contention and the
evidence regarding the heavy snow storm in the area at that time.
Accordingly I accept as factual the Union's contention and the
decision of the grievants' that the highway was unsafe and
"impassable" within the meaning of Article 14 of the Agreement.
The Company has the right to promulgate reasonable

rules

requiring drivers to call in when they are stuck or delayed en
route.

The rule which the Company refers to herein is clearly

reasonable.

When drivers are delayed due to weather, breakdowns

or otherwise for an extended period of time, the Company is entitled to know where they are and the conditions which have
interrupted their traveling so that it can consider the available
options and give instructions.

However, in the instant case I

am not at all persuaded that the Company effectively promulgated,
disseminated or implemented any such rule.

It is undisputed that

if the drivers were told of that rule, it was done verbally.
Though it is obviously an important rule it is not in writing.
Moreover and significantly, the evidence persuades me that whether
the drivers knew of it or not, some followed it and some did not
as a matter of practice, and that either way the Company did not
withhold pay.
Therefore, under the particular circumstances of this case,
and because I find that the Company did not effectively legislate
and uniformly enforce the rule and because there is no real contest
over the "impassable" conditions of the highway during the relevant
time the grievance is granted and the Company shall pay Dycus and
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Hughes for the eight hours involved.
Grievance of Brown and Calvert
The grievants in this matter while en route south from North
Bergen, New Jersey to Spartanburg ran into a snow storm at about
2 AM on February 7, 1979.

They pulled into a Holiday Inn in

Henderson, North Carolina and called the Company's dispatcher at
about 2:30 AM.

When the dispatcher was told that the grievants

did not believe that they could continue driving, he instructed
them to check into a motel and to callback between 9 and 10 AM
for further instructions.

The grievants parked their truck and

checked into the Holiday Inn and went to sleep.

After calling-

in as instructed later that morning they resumed driving south
at about 10 AM.
The Company has denied the grievants pay for the seven and
one-half hours between 2:30 AM and 10 AM.

It asserts that in

accordance with Article 16 of the Agreement they were on "layover" status, having been'relieved of duty9"

The Union contends

that based on the history of negotiations and the language of
paragraph (b) of Article 16 namely that
"This provision shall not be applied arbitrarily ... or inconsistently with the above provisions ....",
it was intended to apply only to layovers at the terminal points
of a trip (i.e. at terminal depots, Company headquarters, etc.)
and not to unexpected delays encountered en route.

It argues

that Article 14 is applicable to the facts in this grievance,
that for the Company to be permitted to utilize Article 16 would
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be an application of that Article "inconsistent" with an "above
provisions", namely the provisions of Article 14; and that any
such use of Article 16 would nullify the rights of the employees
under Article 14.
It is my conclusion that under the facts of this grievance
Article 16 is applicable and that

the grievants were placed

on "layover" status and "relieved of duty" in accordance therewith.

Article 16 is not ambiguous.

Hence, traditionally its

"legislative" history and past practice are not relevant.

It

sets forth how drivers will be paid "if relieved of duty."

There

are no conditions on when a driver will be relieved of duty.

Had

it been intended to apply solely to the terminal points of routes
it could and should have said so.

It is significantly distinguished

from Article 14 by the fact, inter alia that drivers "relieved of
duty" for more than eight hours are entitled to motel or hotel
sleeping quarters.

The grievants in this case were instructed

to check into the Holiday Inn and did so.

I consider that arrange-

ment markedly different from where drivers, under Article 14, are
"required to stay with the unit for the time lost ... " Clearly
a driver is much more discomforted by the requirement that he
stay with his truck (presumably either in the truck or at a
truck stop) then when he is asleep in a motel.

Moreover, I

think the grievants recognized they had been relieved of duty
when on their trip report they originally wrote that they "went
off duty at Henderson, North Carolina, at 2 AM; went
duty at 10:30 AM due to icy roads."

back on
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Finally, resorting to practice, though as I have stated an unambiguous contract clause stands as written, there are a sufficient examples offered by the Company showing the application and
utilization of Article 16 to interruptions en route, to place in
doubt the Union's assertion that Article 16 was intended by the
parties to be applicable only to layovers at terminal points of
routes.
I am mindful of and do not disagree with the Union's assertion that under certain speculative circumstances the Company
might be able to try to use Article 16 to nullify the benefits
of Article 14.

The hypothetical examples given by the Union in

its brief would in many respects be an application of Article 16
which would be inconsistent with Article 14 or which would
effectively nullify Article 14.

I do not find the instant

grievance to be comparable to those examples.

Rather I think

that the grievants, faced with an impassable highway and unsafe
driving conditions, were placed on layover status and accepted
that status when, after calling in, they parked and left their
truck and went to sleep for about seven and one-half hours in the
Holiday Inn.

Under different circumstances and where as Impartial

Chairman I am persuaded that the Company is attempting to use
Article 16 to diminish or nullify the benefits of Article 14, I
will not hesitate to enjoin the Company from doing so.
The Undersigned, duly designated as the Arbitrator, and
having duly heard the proofs and allegations of the above named
parties makes the following AWARD:
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The Employer violated Article 14 of the
Transportation Supplemental Agreement
by refusing to pay Gary Dycus and Arnold
Hughes for eight hours on March 3, 1979.
The Company shall pay them for that time.
The Employer did not violate Article 14
of the Transporation Supplemental Agreement by refusing to pay James Brown and
Fate Calvert for seven and one-half hours
on February 7, 1979.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: August 22, 1980
STATE OF New York )
COUNTY OF New York ) ss<:
On this twenty-second day of August, 1980, before me
personally came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known
and known to me to be the individual described in and who
executed the foregoing instrument and he acknowledged to
me that he executed the same.

In The Matter of The Arbitration
between
International Ladies' Garment
Workers Union

and

OPINION
AND
AWARD

Jonathan Logan, Inc.
(Tracy Fashions)

The stipulated issue is:
Whether the Company's change of the
regular schedule of working hours
violated the contract? If so what shall
be the remedy?
A hearing was held in Baltimore, Maryland on March 19,
1980 at which time representatives of the Company and Union
appeared and were afforded full opportunity to offer evidence and
argument and to examine and cross-examine witnesses.

The

Arbitrator's Oath was waived.
In September 1979 the Company changed the regular shift
hours from 7:30 AM to 3 PM, to 8 AM to 3:30 PM.

I find that it

did so in compliance with the contract.
Article VI paragraph 7 of the contract provides in pertinent part:
Notice of change in a regular schedule
of working hours
shall be given at
least two (2) weeks in advance.
It is undisputed that the Company gave the requisite two weeks
notice of the change in the working hours.
In view of this specific contract clause which places that
single restriction on the Company's right to change the schedule
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of working hours, I must reject the Union's reliance on Article
XXVI of the contract.

It is well settled that an express contract

provision, dealing specifically with the subject in dispute preempts a provision that is general in nature.

Hence, the Company's

change in the work schedule with the requisite two weeks notice,
has neither contractually

nor substantively "lower(ed) standards

or working conditions" within the meaning of Article XXVI.
Nor do I find that the Company exercised its right arbitrarily.

It offered acceptable testimony and explanation of the business

and production reasons for the schedule change.
I accept the Union's assertion, as evidenced by the petition
of many employees, that the changed work schedule has disturbed
some private life arrangements of some of the employees.

Car

pools to work and arrangements to get children to school and to
safely pick them up at school bus stops at the end of the school
day apparently have been disrupted.
However, the Arbitrator's authority is confined to the
contract.

In the face of the Article VI rights of the Company and

its business reasons for making the work schedule change, the
Arbitrator is without power to reverse that action because of
difficulties employees may encounter.

Rather, as the Company

stated it would be willing to do, the personal difficulties of
individual employees are matters which may be discussed directly
by the Union with the Company, in an effort to work out adjustment:
on a situation by situation basis.

-3-

The Undersigned, Impartial Chairman under the Collective
Bargaining Agreement between the above named parties, and having
duly heard the proofs and allegations of said parties, makes the
following AWARD:
The Company's change of the regular
schedule of working hours did not
violate the contract.

Eric J. Schmertz
Impartial Chairman
DATED: May 12, 1980
STATE OF New York)
COUNTY OF New York)38':
On this twelfth day of May, 1980, before me personally
came and appeared Eric J. Schmertz to me known and known to me
to be the individual described in and who executed the foregoing
instrument and he acknowledged to me that he executed the same.

